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Neuroscience is one of the fastest growing scientific fields in terms 
of the numbers of scientists and the knowledge being gained.1  In recent 
years, both the scope of neuroscience and the methodologies employed 
by neuroscientists have broadly expanded, from biochemical and genetic 
analysis of individual nerve cells and their molecular constituents, to the 
imaging of brain structure and function.2  Perhaps the most significant 
recent neuroscientific achievement is the ability of neuroimaging 
technologies, including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
to image brain function.3  Clinicians and scientists use fMRI not only to 
map sensory, motor, and cognitive function, but also to study the neural 
 
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Health Law and PolicyCenter, Drake University Law 
School, Des Moines, Iowa.   I thank Austin Sarat, Martha Umphrey, John Servos, Lawrence 
Douglas, Jan Dizard, Anthony Bishop, and Steve George at Amherst College for inviting me to write 
this Article as part of the “NeuroLaw: What Neuroscience Offersto Law” conference, sponsored by 
the Amherst College President’s Initiative Fund.   I also thank the participants of the NeuroLaw 
conference, including Hank Greely, Stephen Morse, Owen Jones, and Joshua Greene, for their 
helpful comments. 
 1. JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN RESEARCH AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 3 
(2006). 
 2. Id. at 17.  See also Peter Woodruff, Imaging the Brain: Clinical and Research 
Implications for Neuropsychiatry, in BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMANITY: THE IMPACT OF 
TECHNOLOGY ON HEALTH CARE ETHICS 147-50 (Chris Gastmans ed., 2002). 
 3. WALTER GLANNON, BIOETHICS AND THE BRAIN 45 (2007). 
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correlates of a range of physical and mental conditions, behaviors, 
characteristics, and preferences.4  Due to its recent move outside the 
clinical and research contexts, fMRI raises a number of ethical, legal, 
and social issues that are being examined within the overlapping fields 
of neuroethics5 and neurolaw.6 
In March 2007, New York Times journalist Jeffrey Rosen identified 
a number of legal issues raised by advances in neuroscience under the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.7  Scholars are examining these and other issues as part of a 
burgeoning neurolaw literature that focuses heavily on criminal law,8 
 
 4. See Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro 
Exceptionalism?  47 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 423-41 (2007). 
 5. See, e.g., JUDY ILLES, NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND 
POLICY ix (2006); STEVEN J. MARCUS, NEUROETHICS: MAPPING THE FIELD (2004). 
 6. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2007 (stating 
that “[t]he extent of that revolution is hotly debated, but the influence of what some called neurolaw 
is clearly growing.”); SEMIR ZEKI & OLIVER GOODENOUGH, LAW & THE BRAIN vi (2006); BRENT 
GARLAND, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE vii-viii 
(2004) (noting that neurolaw also has been used to refer to the area of personal injury trial practice 
dealing with traumatic brain injuries and spinal cord injuries.).  See, e.g., J. SHERROD TAYLOR, 
NEUROLAW: BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD INJURIES § 1:04 (1997). 
 7. Rosen, supra note 6. 
 8. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 693 
(2007); O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1265 (2007); O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging, Entrapment, and the Predisposition to Crime, 
7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 60 (2007); Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and 
the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115 (2007); Melissa S. Caulum, 
Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect Between Neuroscience, Emerging Adults, and the 
Corrections System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 729 (2007); Abram S. Barth, A Double-Edged Sword: The 
Role of Neuroimaging in Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501 (2007); Debra 
Niehoff, Invisible Scars: The Neurobiological Consequences of Child Abuse, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 
847 (2007); Owen D. Jones, Law, Evolution, and the Brain: Applications and Open Questions, in 
LAW & THE BRAIN 57 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006); Joshua Greene and Jonathan 
Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, in LAW & THE BRAIN, 207 
(Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and 
Behavioral Biology, 105(2) COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim 
Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3(2) OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006); 
Stephen J. Morse, Moral and Legal Responsibility and the New Neuroscience, in NEUROETHICS: 
DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 33 (Judy Illes ed., 2006); Oliver R. 
Goodenough, Responsibility and Punishment: Whose Mind? A Response, in LAW & THE BRAIN 259 
(Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006); Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B. Berson, Mental Illness 
and the Death Penalty, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351 (2006); Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal 
Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, in LAW & THE BRAIN 227 (Semir Zeki & Oliver 
Goodenough eds., 2006); Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and 
Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51 (2006); James H. Fallon, 
Neuroanatomical Background to Understanding the Brain of the Young Psychopath, 3 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 341 (2006); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the Law: A 
Role in Juvenile Justice? 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321 (2006); Katherine H. Federle, The Mind of a 
Child: The Relationship between Brain Development, Cognitive Functioning, and Accountability 
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criminal procedure,9 and evidence law,10 as well as tort law,11 property 
law,12 intellectual property,13 confidentiality and privacy,14 protection of 
human subjects,15 the regulation of neuroscience-based technologies, 
 
under the Law, 3(2) OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 317 (2006); Jessie A. Seiden, The Criminal Brain: Frontal 
Lobe Dysfunction in Capital Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395 (2004); Lucy C. Ferguson, The 
Implications of Developmental Cognitive Research on “Evolving Standards of Decency” and the 
Imposition of the Death Penalty on Juveniles, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 441 (2004); Laura Reider, Toward 
a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and 
Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289 (1998). 
 9. See, e.g., Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of Interrogation Jurisprudence?, 33 
AM. J.L. & MED. 341 (2007); Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for 
Lie Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359 (2007); Michael S. Pardo, 
Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301 (2006); 
Erich Taylor, A New Wave of Police Interrogation? “Brain Fingerprinting,” The Constitutional 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, and Hearsay Jurisprudence, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 
287 (2006); Sean Kevin Thompson, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in 
Intelligence Interrogation, 90(6) CORNELL L. REV. 1601 (2005); Richard G. Boire, Searching the 
Brain: The Fourth Amendment Implications of Brain-Based Deception Devices, 5(2) AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 62 (2005). 
 10. See, e.g., Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319 (2007); Leo Kittay, Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection: The 
Cultural Bias against “Mind Reading” Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351 (2007); Erin A. Egan, 
Neuroimaging as Evidence, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 62 (2007); Jocelyn Downie & 
Ronalda Murphy, Inadmissible, Eh?, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 67 (2007); Charles 
N.W. Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for Credibility 
Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509 (2006); Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Lie Detection: Is a “Brainstorm” Heading Toward the Gatekeeper? 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 1 (2006). 
 11. See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, Emotional Harm, and Emotional Distress Tort 
Claims, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 65 (2007); Adrian M. Viens, The Use of Functional 
Neuroimaging Technology in the Assessment of Loss and Damages in Tort Law, 7(9) AM. J. 
BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 63 (2007); Adam Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective 
Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433 (2007). 
 12. See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property ‘Instinct,’ in LAW & THE BRAIN 185 (Semir 
Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006). 
 13. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible 
Legal and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: 
BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 114 (Brent Garland ed., 2004). 
 14. See, e.g., Tovino, supra note 4, at 416; Henry T. Greely, The Social Effects of Advances in 
Neuroscience: Legal Problems, Legal Perspectives, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN 
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 245 (Judy Illes ed., 2006); Stacey A. Tovino, The Visible Brain: 
Confidentiality and Privacy Implications of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (2006) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas) (on file with author); Stacey A. Tovino, The 
Confidentiality and Privacy Implications of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33(4) J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 844 (2005); Committee on Science and Law, Are Your Thoughts Your Own? 
“Neuroprivacy” and the Legal Implications of Brain Imaging, 60 CBA RECORD 407 (2005); 
Greely, supra note 13, at 114. 
 15. See, e.g., Jennifer Kulynych, Some Thoughts about the Evaluation of Non-Clinical 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 57 (2007); 
Jennifer Kulynych, The Regulation of MR Neuroimaging Research: Disentangling the Gordian 
Knot, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 295 (2007); Jennifer Kulynych, Legal and Ethical Issues in 
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especially fMRI-based lie detectors,16 and even practical advice for 
lawyers and judges regarding the assessment of neuroscience-based legal 
claims and the evaluation of the training, credentials, and courtroom 
credibility of neurospsychological experts.17 
Little attention has been paid, however, to the implications of 
advances in neuroscience for more traditional civil and regulatory health 
law issues.  I thus explore the ways in which neuroscience impacts a 
range of health, disability, and benefit law issues, including the scope of 
public and private health insurance benefits (Part II), the mental health 
parity debate (Part III), protected status under federal and state disability 
law (Part IV), and the distribution of benefits under social security and 
other benefit programs (Part V).  I find that patients, patient advocacy 
organizations, litigants, lobbyists, legislatures, and scholars are relying 
on advances in neuroscience to characterize traditionally suspect mental 
health conditions as brain-based conditions worthy of insurance 
coverage, protected civil status, and disability and other benefits.  
Although stakeholders, by and large, are not making completely 
unfounded or speculative claims about neuroscience, what does give me 
cause for pause is the appropriateness of the subsequent normative 
argument; that is, that all mental disorders should be treated as covered 
or protected conditions for purposes of health, disability, and benefit 
law.  I conclude that advances in neuroscience give us reason to revisit 
age-old health, disability, and benefit law questions (such as, “Which 
kinds of mental suffering create a legitimate claim for assistance from 
others through [public or private] health insurance?”),18 but that 
neuroscience does not yet answer these questions.  Because I anticipate 
that neuroscience will continue to play a role in the development and 
shaping of health, disability, and benefit law and policy, I recommend 
that lawyers and scholars who work in these areas (and not just those 
who self-identify as neuroethicists or neurolawyers) be mindful of the 
 
Neuroimaging Research: Human Subjects Protection, Medical Privacy, and the Public 
Communication of Research Results, 50(3) BRAIN & COGNITION 345 (2002). 
 16. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent 
Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. AND MED. 377 (2007); Henry T. Greely, Premarket Approval 
Regulation for Lie Detection: An Idea Whose Time May Be Coming, 5(2) AM. J. BIOETHICS 50 
(2005). 
 17. See, e.g., Daniel R. Orme & George Johnstone, Clinical Neuropsychologists: Training, 
Credentials and Courtroom Credibility, 59 J. MO. B. 184 (2003); R.K. McKinzey, A Judge’s 
Introduction to Neuropsychological Assessments, 37 COURT REV. 24 (2001). 
 18. James E. Sabin & Norman Daniels, Determining “Medical Necessity” in Mental Health 
Practice, 24(6) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 5 (1994). 
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ways in which stakeholders will use neuroscience to bear on the 
formulation and interpretation of such law.19 
A few caveats and prefatory notes are in order.  First, the field of 
health law is extraordinarily broad and rapidly changing.20  In this 
Article, I select just a few examples that I think are illustrative, although 
not exhaustive, of the ways in which stakeholders currently are using 
neuroscience to impact health law and policy.  I hope that readers with 
background in health law and policy will identify additional, relevant 
settings in which neuroscience-based arguments may be raised and will 
question whether such arguments should work in these settings. 
Second, I will not be examining the desirability of the health, 
disability, and benefit legal structures referenced in this Article.  The 
question I am trying to examine is, assuming their continued existence, 
how might neuroscience impact their application? 
Third, my approach in other neuroethics and neurolaw articles has 
been one of caution, and this Article is no different.  I have been careful 
elsewhere and am careful here not to speculate about the potential of 
neuroscience.  For reasons discussed herein, I anticipate that 
stakeholders will continue to incorporate neuroscience-based arguments 
into legal discussions, so I do think that lawyers and policymakers need 
to be able to assess the traps, pitfalls, and potential merit of such 
arguments, and recognize the evidentiary, substantive, and normative 
responses that are available. 
Finally, I think it is helpful to state at the outset the impetus for this 
Article.  In addition to teaching an introductory health law course that 
focuses on health care quality, access, finance, and organization, I teach 
a range of upper-level courses focused on civil and regulatory health law 
issues.  These include Mental Health Law, Elder Law, Law and 
Bioethics, Complementary and Alternative Medicine and the Law, 
Patients’ Rights, Comparative Health Law, and HIPAA Privacy.  During 
 
 19. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 3, 10 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. 
Winick eds., 1991) (encouraging stakeholders to consider ways in which the clinical literature might 
bear on the formulation of legal arrangements). 
 20. Health law has been described as both an exciting and interdisciplinary field as well as an 
incoherent discipline.  See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health Law, 41(2) 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 392 (2006) (stating that “the practice of health law is a huge, growing, 
and vibrant activity.”); Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law? 41(2) 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365, 365 (2006) (describing health law as incoherent and disjointed); Mark 
A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41(2) WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 347, 353-54 (2006) (describing the evolution of health law into a coherent sub-discipline of 
the law); Mark A. Hall et al., Rethinking Health Law, 41(2) WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 347-48 
(2006). 
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class preparation and discussion, I am surprised by the frequency with 
which I am confronted with neuroscience-based stories and related 
policy suggestions.  During my fall 2006 Mental Health Law class, for 
example, a thirty-five-year-old guest lecturer who has bipolar disorder 
and is dually eligible (i.e., she receives social security disability benefits 
from the Medicare Program as well as assistance with out-of-pocket 
medical expenses from the Minnesota Medical Assistance program) 
explained how she enjoyed participating in a free University of 
Minnesota neuroimaging study, the purpose of which was to study the 
efficacy of a drug for bipolar disorder that is covered neither by 
Medicare nor Medicaid.  Because my guest lecturer believes that the 
experimental drug assisted her in resuming many activities of daily 
living and enabled her to begin part-time volunteer work at a local 
mental health facility, which she tremendously enjoys, she believes 
Medicare and Medicaid should cover the drug.  In another Mental Health 
Law class, devoted to the topic of the civil commitment of pedophiles 
and other sexually dangerous persons in the State of Minnesota, a guest 
lecturer referenced recent investigations into the brains of pedophiles to 
suggest a scheme for the release or permanent commitment, as 
appropriate, of past pedophiles based on the results of a multi-
disciplinary team’s traditional psychiatric and (neuroimaging-based) 
neurological evaluation.  In my spring 2008 Complementary and 
Alternative Medicine and the Law seminar, one student who was 
questioning the efficacy of a range of alternative medicines and their 
reimbursement by health insurers piqued the interest of another student, 
who had recently read a review article examining the correlation 
between specific acupuncture points and specific areas of brain 
activation and deactivation, as measured by fMRI and positron emission 
tomography.21  In this Article, I hope to show how stakeholders are 
using advances in neuroscience to make similar, although more formal, 
legal arguments and to lay the groundwork for analyzing these claims. 
I.  MENTAL DISORDER STATISTICS 
Much of this Article involves the civil and administrative treatment 
of individuals with mental disorders.  “Mental disorders are common in 
the United States” and abroad.22  According to the National Institute of 
 
 21. George T. Lewith et al., Investigating Acupuncture Using Brain Imaging Techniques: The 
Current State of Play, 2(3) ECAM 315, 315 (2005) (stating that “[f]or example, points associated 
with hearing and vision stimulate the visual and auditory cerebral areas respectively.”). 
 22. National Institute of Mental Health, Statistics, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health 
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Mental Health (NIMH), an estimated 26.2% of American adults (or 57.5 
million) suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.23  
Approximately 6% of American adults (or one in seventeen) suffer from 
a serious mental illness.24  And, an estimated 45% of American adults 
who have one diagnosable mental disorder meet criteria for at least one 
more diagnosable mental disorder.25 
Historically, individuals with mental disorders were treated with 
contempt, fear, and cruelty, perhaps due to the belief that mental 
disorders stemmed from parental misdeeds, demonic possession, or 
deficient character.26  Mental illness remains poorly understood today.27  
The National Mental Health Association, recently renamed Mental 
Health America (MHA), estimates that 71% of Americans still believe 
that mental illness is caused by mental weakness, 65% believe that 
mental illness is the product of poor parenting, and 35% believe that 
mental illness is a form of retribution for sinful or immoral behavior.28  
Many patients, patient advocacy organizations, litigants, lobbyists, 
legislators, and scholars believe that the stigma against mental disorders 
plays a role in their lack of funding for research, their lack of parity in 
public and private health insurance coverage, and their lack of available 
and reimbursable treatments.29  Four sets of mental disorders, including 
 
/statistics/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2008). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., Keith Nelson, Legislative and Judicial Solutions for Mental Health Parity: S. 
543, Reasonable Accommodation, and an Individualized Remedy under Title I of the ADA, 51 AM. 
U. L. REV. 91, 97 (2001); Brian K. LaFratta, The Mental Health Parity Act: A Bar to Insurance 
Benefits for the Elderly? 8 ELDER L.J. 393, 406 (2000) (stating that “until recently, the public 
viewed mental illness as a curse or an affliction that one brought upon him or herself.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Jeffery Fraser, Allegheny County Mental Health Court Project, Executive 
Summary 2 (Sept. 4, 2004), http://199.224.17.100/uploadedFiles/DHS/Individual_ 
and_Community_Health/Mental_Health_Services_and_Support/Forensic_Services/MHCourtExecut
iveSummary.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2008). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Pamela Signorello, The Failure of the ADA-Achieving Parity with Respect to 
Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage in the Private Employment Realm, 10 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 349, 368 (2001) (stating that “[s]ome diseases are more politically ‘in’ than others.  We 
all know the more political backing there is, the more attention, the more funds, and the more 
patient-protection legislation.  My guess is that if AIDS rates a 10, then breast cancer is a 7, prostate 
cancer is a 6 . . . . Yes, you guessed it.  I am unable to assign a number to the mental health 
category.  If I have to judge by the coverage in the popular press, the category is close the bottom of 
the food chain.”); id. at 368, 371 (stating that “[c]ontrary to lingering public perception, mental 
illnesses are not indicative of personal weakness, lack of character, or poor upbringing . . . . One 
thing is certain.  The stigma associated with mental illness has supported the disparity in health care 
coverage.”); Nicole Martinson, Inequality between Disabilities: The Different Treatment of Mental 
Versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 361, 361 
10-TOVINO_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009  1:20 PM 
476 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:469 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, drug and alcohol dependence, and 
anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa, are frequently used to illustrate 
these claims.  A brief summary of the neuroscientific investigation of 
these four sets of disorders is set forth at Appendix A to this Article.  A 
careful review of these studies reveals many findings as well as many 
discrepancies and contradictions.30  Some of these studies do find that 
the brains of individuals affected by these conditions are 
neuroanatomically, neurocognitively, and/or neurochemically “different” 
when compared to the brains of healthy controls.31  In the past twenty 
years, stakeholders have referenced these findings in an attempt to 
influence health law and policy, especially the scope of private and 
public health insurance benefits. 
II.  THE SCOPE OF HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS 
Most adult Americans with private health insurance coverage 
receive coverage through their employers as a benefit of employment.32  
When employers first began offering health insurance benefits,33 covered 
employees generally had access to physical and mental health benefits 
under the same terms and conditions.34  Beginning in the 1970s, many 
 
(1998) (stating that “[t]he stigma of mental illness has kept many in need from seeking help, and it 
has prevented policymakers from providing it.”); Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in 
Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 63, 85 (1997) (citing 142 Cong. Rec. S3590 (Daily ed. Apr.18, 1996) (statement of Senator 
Wellstone)) (stating that “[t]he stigma of mental illness has kept many in need from seeking help, 
and it has prevented policymakers from providing it.  And for too long, persons in need of mental 
health services who reach private coverage discriminatory limits have been dumped onto 
Government-funded programs.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Russell T. Loeber et al., Differences in Cerebellar Blood Volume in 
Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder, 37 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 81, 81 (1999) (reporting findings and 
contradictions in brain studies of individuals with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder). 
 31. See, e.g., Richard E. Gardner, Mind Over Matter? The Historical Search for Meaningful 
Parity Between Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 683 (2000) 
(quoting Fuller Torrey, one of America’s most famous psychiatrists: “[T]he ‘evidence is now 
overwhelming that the brains of persons who have schizophrenia are, as a group, different from 
brains of persons who do not have the disease.’”); Karen Faith Berman, Functional Neuroimaging 
in Schizophrenia, in NEUROSPYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: THE FIFTH GENERATION OF PROGRESS 745, 
747 (Kenneth L. Davis et al. eds., 2002); Philip McGuire et al., Functional Neuroimaging in 
Schizophrenia: Diagnosis and Drug Discovery, 29(2) TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 91, 96 
(2008) . 
 32. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 26, at 92. 
 33. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE 
RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 294-95 (1949) 
(discussing early examples of employer-based health insurance). 
 34. Dana L. Kaplan, Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s Mental Health Dilemma? 
Current State Legislative Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
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employers reduced their mental health benefits, which were thought to 
be more expensive than physical health benefits.35  The Jackson Hole 
Group, an influential body of health care executives and policy analysts, 
even recommended that employers limit their mental health benefits to 
twenty outpatient visits and thirty inpatient days each year.36  Some 
employers also increased deductibles and lowered lifetime and daily 
limits applicable to mental health care.37 
These benefit package changes resulted in a disparity between the 
private insurance coverage that was provided for employees’ physical 
illnesses and mental disorders.38  Health insurance plans that covered 
365 days of inpatient care for physical illnesses might cover only 45 
days of inpatient care for mental disorders.39  Plans that provided 
unlimited outpatient visits for treatment of physical illnesses might allow 
only twenty outpatient visits for treatment of mental disorders.40  And 
plans that contained a $1 million lifetime cap for treatment of physical 
illnesses might contain only a $50,000 lifetime cap for treatment of 
mental disorders.41  These coverage disparities adversely affected 
individuals with both “traditional” and “suspect” mental health 
conditions.42  Many individuals with disabling bipolar disorder and 
severe anorexia nervosa, for example, were forced to discontinue their 
inpatient and outpatient treatments when they had reached their mental 
health benefit caps.43  The lack of treatment exacerbated underlying 
illnesses and symptoms, sometimes leading to unemployment, 
homelessness, incarceration, and premature death.44 
 
325, 328 (2005). 
 35. See, e.g., Allan Beigel & Steven S. Sharfstein, Mental Health Care Providers: Not the 
Only Cause or Only Cure for Rising Costs, 142(5) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 668, 668 (May 1984) 
(stating that “[i]n 1955 mental health expenditures were estimated to be $1.2 billion, or 6% of all 
expenditures.  By 1977 the total amount of expenditures for mental health care had risen to $19.6 
billion, 12% of all expenditures.  Even with a correction for population growth and price increases, 
this amounts to a fourfold increase in mental health expenditures.”); Kaplan, supra note 34, at 328 
(stating that mental health benefits are two to three times as expensive as physical illness benefits). 
 36. See Robert Pear, White House Plan Would Cover Costs of Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 1993, at A1. 
 37. See, e.g., Beigel & Sharfstein, supra note 35, at 668 (stating that “[c]osts have risen, 
resulting in resistance to financing treatment of mental illness in both public and private sectors.”); 
Kaplan, supra note 34, at 328. 
 38. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 34, at 328. 
 39. See Shannon, supra note 29, at 68. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See, e.g., Beth A. Brunalli, Anorexia Killed Her, but the System Failed Her: Does the 
American Insurance System Suffer from Anorexia?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 583, 591, 597-98 (2006). 
 44. See, e.g., John V. Jacobi, Parity and Difference: The Value of Parity Legislation for the 
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, some patients who were denied 
additional mental health benefits sued their insurers, arguing that their 
conditions were physical rather than mental in nature and thus covered 
under the “better” set of benefits.45  In these contract-based lawsuits, the 
plaintiffs’ experts routinely referenced advances in the behavioral and 
brain sciences to support their testimony.  In a 1987 case out of 
Arkansas, for example, an insured father sued Blue Cross Blue Shield 
(BCBS) when it denied additional benefits to his dependent daughter, 
who had a diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder.46  The BCBS plan at 
issue in Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe provided 
liberal benefits for hospitalization and medical treatment for physical 
illnesses and accidental injuries, but only limited benefits for “mental, 
psychiatric, and nervous conditions,” which the plan did not define.47  At 
trial, the father called three psychiatrists and two clinical psychologists 
to testify that bipolar disorder is a physical disease of the brain.48  The 
experts referenced advances in “medical research” to support their 
testimony that bipolar affective disorder is an illness of the brain that 
stems from physical and biological causes.49  The court ultimately 
agreed that the daughter’s illness was a physical condition within the 
meaning of the BCBS plan,50 but the victory was short-lived.51  
Following the Doe decision, BCBS re-wrote its Arkansas policy and 
clarified that the coverage limitation for psychiatric conditions applied 
whether the condition was “‘organic or non-organic, whether of 
biological, non-biological, chemical or non-chemical origin, and 
irrespective of cause, basis or inducement.’”52 
Two years later, in 1989, a New York appellate court came to a 
similar result by focusing instead on the nature of the medical treatment 
provided to the patient.53  In Simons v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Greater 
 
Seriously Mentally Ill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 185 (2003); Nelson, supra note 26, at 99. 
 45. See, e.g., Brunalli, supra note 43, at 598. 
 46. Ark. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe, 733 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987). 
 47. Id. at 430. 
 48. Id. at 431. 
 49. Id. at 431 (stating that “Dr. Thomas Harris, a treating psychiatrist . . . stated it is in fact a 
physical disorder.  ‘The medical research is now, in my opinion, overwhelming in that regard.’  He 
stated that it was an illness of the brain and body rather than of the mind and stemmed from a 
chemical imbalance which responds to medication.  This illness, like many others he described, 
manifests some behavioral or emotional disturbances, but the causes of those manifestations are 
physical and biological in nature as distinguished from mental.”). 
 50. Id. at 432. 
 51. Shannon, supra note 29, at 76. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Simons v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 536 N.Y.S.2d 431, 431-32 (N.Y. 
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New York, an insured father sued BCBS after it denied coverage for 
additional inpatient days for his dependent teenage daughter, Amy, who 
had anorexia nervosa.54  The BCBS plan at issue covered 120 days each 
year of inpatient hospitalization for “appropriate medical treatment,” but 
only thirty days of inpatient hospitalization for “psychiatric disorders.”55  
At trial, several pediatricians testified that the additional inpatient 
treatments Amy received, including nasogastric feedings and 
intravenous fluids, were necessary because of her physical condition, 
which was extremely emaciated, malnourished, dehydrated, and 
hypotensive.56  The court agreed and ruled that Amy’s inpatient 
hospitalization was covered because it involved medical, not psychiatric, 
treatment.57  Other courts faced with similar claims also have focused on 
the nature of the treatment provided.  In cases in which the treatment 
involved psychotherapy, psychotropic medications, and 
electroconvulsive therapy, the courts tend to rule in favor of the 
insurer.58 
Some courts focus not on the origin of the plaintiff’s condition or 
the nature of the treatments provided but, instead, on the ways in which 
the plaintiff’s condition manifests itself.  In Equitable Life Insurance 
Society v. Berry, a plaintiff, who became totally disabled as a result of 
his bipolar disorder, sued his insurance company for both long-term 
disability benefits and medical benefits.59  The long-term disability plan 
expressly excluded coverage for “mental and nervous disorders.”60  The 
 
App. Div. 1989). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 432. 
 56. Id. at 433. 
 57. Id. at 434 (stating that “[t]he plain, ordinary meaning of ‘psychiatric’ care is the sort of 
treatment, such as electroshock therapy and psychotropic medication, rendered to a patient who has 
been admitted to a psychiatric ward in order to attend to his or her psychiatric disorder.  Amy was 
hospitalized because of malnutrition and hypotension, not depression or some other psychological 
malady, and, in that respect, she was provided with the medical treatment necessary to alleviate her 
particular physical problems.  The fact that Amy’s physical disability was the result of the 
psychiatric condition known as anorexia nervosa does not transform what is customarily medical 
treatment into psychiatric treatment; malnutrition and hypotension necessitate the same medical care 
regardless of whether the condition is attributable to anorexia nervosa, some organic source or 
simply the financial inability to procure food.  It is the physical condition, and the treatment 
required to deal with that condition, which is crucial, not the reason for the disorder.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(treating the insured’s postpartum depression as a mental illness because the insured received 
individual psychotherapy, psychoactive drug therapy, electroconvulsive therapy, and participated in 
group counseling sessions). 
 59. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Berry, 212 Cal. App. 3d 832, 834-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1989). 
 60. Id. at 835. 
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medical plan stated that it would pay only 50% of physician charges for 
“mental and/or nervous treatment,” which the plan defined as “treatment 
for a neurosis, psycho-neurosis, psychopathy, psychosis, or mental or 
nervous disease or disorder of any kind.”61  At trial, the plaintiff called 
an expert witness who testified that the plaintiff’s disorder was an 
organic disease caused by a chemical imbalance and other physiological 
disease processes.62  The court, taking judicial notice of the then-current 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM), which listed bipolar disorder as a mental disorder,63 disagreed, 
stating that the test was whether the manifestation, not the origin, of the 
disorder was mental or physical in nature.64  Because the plaintiff’s 
disorder manifested itself in very high moods and very low moods, the 
court classified his disorder as a mental disorder.65 
In 1990, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also focused on 
symptoms, reasoning that most laypersons understand illnesses in terms 
of their symptoms, not their origin.  In Brewer v. Lincoln National Life 
Insurance Company, an insured father sued Lincoln National Life 
Insurance Company when it denied additional benefits to his dependent 
son, who had an affective mood disorder that manifested itself in a sharp 
decline in grades, repeated incidents of lying, mood swings, and aberrant 
behavior in and out of school.66  One of the applicable insurance plans 
limited coverage for hospital charges associated with “‘mental 
illness(es), functional nervous disorder(s) . . . or for psychiatric or 
psychoanalytic care.’”67  A second applicable plan limited coverage for 
the care of “‘mental illness(es).’”68  Neither plan defined mental 
illness.69  At trial, the father called three physicians of various specialties 
to testify that “mounting medical evidence suggest[s] that affective 
mood disorder is genetically or biologically caused.”70  Notwithstanding, 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 839-40. 
 63. Id. at 840. 
 64. Id. (stating that “[e]very reasonable layman would view a person manifesting such 
derangement as suffering from a mental disease.  The policies here in question exclude all mental 
disease from coverage . . . regardless of whether the disability was caused by a chemical imbalance, 
a blow on the head, being frightened by a black cat, inability to cope or whatever . . . . In the 
disability policy, mental disorders are expressly ‘not covered’.  Period . . . . Manifestation, not 
cause, is the yardstick.”). 
 65. Id. at 839-40. 
 66. Brewer v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 152, 154 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 67. Id. at 152. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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the Eighth Circuit found that the son’s affective mood disorder was a 
mental illness subject to the more limited coverage because symptoms, 
not origin, mattered, and because most laypersons would agree that the 
symptoms of affective mood disorder are behavioral, rather than 
physical, in nature.71  Other courts also have followed the layperson 
approach en route to ruling in favor of the insurer.72 
In a 1992 case, the Seventh Circuit blamed the insurer for failing to 
adequately define “mental illness” in its contractual provisions that 
provided lower lifetime benefits, lower annual benefits, and lower daily 
benefits for mental illnesses.73  In Phillips v. Lincoln National Life 
Insurance Company, an insured father sued Lincoln National, the same 
defendant in the previous case, when Lincoln National denied additional 
benefits to the father’s dependent son, James, who had a diagnosis of 
congenital encephalopathy that gave rise to a range of behavioral 
problems.74  To prove that James’ condition was a physical illness, 
subject to the better benefit package, the father submitted evidence of a 
brain scan that revealed a portion of James’ brain that was “‘not putting 
out the electrical impulses or processing electrical stimuli and impulses 
the way it would normally.’”75  The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed 
the district court’s decision to construe the “mental illness” provision 
against the insurer because the provision did not define mental illness.76  
 
 71. Id. at 154 (stating that “[t]he cause of a disease is a judgment for experts, while laymen 
know and understand symptoms.  Laymen undoubtedly are aware that some mental illnesses are 
organically caused while others are not; however, they do not classify illnesses based on their 
origins.  Instead, laypersons are inclined to focus on the symptoms of an illness; illnesses whose 
primary symptoms are depression, mood swings and unusual behavior are commonly characterized 
as mental illnesses regardless of their cause . . . . [The son’s] disease manifested itself in terms of 
mood swings and aberrant behavior.  Regardless of the cause of his disorder, it is abundantly clear 
that he suffered from what laypersons would consider to be a ‘mental illness.’”). 
 72. See, e.g., Tolson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 604, 609-10 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(following the layperson approach in concluding that depression is a mental illness); Lynd v. 
Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 979, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[l]aypersons are 
inclined to focus on the symptoms of an illness; illnesses whose primary symptoms are depression, 
mood swings and unusual behavior are commonly characterized as mental illness regardless of their 
cause.”); Pelletier v. Fleet Fin. Group, 2000 WL 1513711, at *5 and n. 7 (D.N.H. Sept. 19, 2000) 
(following the layperson approach in concluding that a major depressive disorder is a mental 
illness); Attar v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 1997 WL 446439, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 1997) (following 
the layperson approach in concluding that bipolar disorder is a mental illness). 
 73. Phillips v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 74. Id. at 304. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 314 (stating that “[i]nsurance policies are almost always drafted by insurers, and 
they should be certain that limitations in their coverage are clear enough for a layperson to 
understand.  Insurers should not be permitted to exploit policy term ambiguities, which they could 
have avoided, to deny coverage to an unsuspecting insured.”). 
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Although the Seventh Circuit did not address the value of the brain scan 
to the issue of whether congenital encephalopathy that manifests itself 
through a range of behavioral problems is a physical or mental illness, 
the Court did reference the competing standards—cause of the condition 
versus how the average layperson perceives the condition77—before 
deciding to hold that the plan’s use of the undefined phrase “mental 
illness” is ambiguous as applied to patients like James who have mental 
disorders caused by organic illnesses.78 
Finally, in a pair of decisions issued in 2006 and 2007, in the case 
of Fitts v. Unum Life Insurance Company, the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia addressed several questions relating 
to the insurance coverage of bipolar disorder.79  The issue before the 
District Court in the 2006 decision was whether bipolar disorder, if 
proved, would be subject to the mental illness cap set forth in the 
defendant’s disability insurance policy.80  The plaintiff called a 
physician to testify that bipolar disorder is a neurobiological disorder 
that affects the physical and chemical structures of the brain: 
He explain[ed] that it may be characterized by certain physical 
occurrences, including degenerative changes observed in the brain, and 
a progressive loss of hippocampal cells in the brain.  In addition, he 
stated that depressive episodes associated with bipolar disorder are 
generally accompanied by large outpourings of corticosteroids (stress 
hormones) from the adrenal gland, which are damaging to a number of 
areas of the brain. . . . [He] ultimately conclude[d] that bipolar disorder 
is a physical illness because it is a disease afflicting a physical organ of 
 
 77. Id. at 308 (stating that “Lincoln acknowledges that the Plan provides no definition of 
mental illness, but nevertheless insists that the term plainly encompasses illnesses like the one 
afflicting James because ‘the average layperson, by merely observing James’ broad range of 
psychiatric and behavioral symptoms and the nature of his treatment, would conclude that he was 
suffering from and being treated for a mental illness or disorder.’  In Lincoln’s view, the cause of an 
illness is irrelevant in determining whether an illness is physical or mental.  This is in direct conflict 
with Phillips’ view that because James’ condition flows from an organic defect, he is suffering from 
a physical illness, with behavioral and emotional manifestations.”) (italicized emphasis in original; 
internal references omitted). 
 78. Id. at 310-11. 
 79. Fitts v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33397, at *2 (D.C. May 7, 2007); Fitts 
v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *12 (D.C. Feb 23, 2006). 
 80. Fitts, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *12 (stating “[the insured] alleges that the term 
‘mental illness’ should be defined to exclude any ailment that has a physical or biological basis.  
Pursuant to that definition, she maintains that her sickness, bipolar disorder, is not a mental illness 
because it has physical, biological, and genetic components.”). 
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the body, just like diseases affecting the heart, the kidneys, or the 
liver.81 
Several of the insurer’s witnesses also conceded in deposition 
testimony that bipolar disorder has biological components.82  The 
insurer, on the other hand, contended that bipolar disorder is a mental 
illness subject to the lower benefit caps because bipolar disorder is 
included within the DSM-IV’s classification of mental disorders83 (even 
though the DSM-IV acknowledges that no good distinction between 
physical and mental disorders exists84), and because “there are no 
physical conditions that must be present for a person to be diagnosed 
with the disorder.”85  In the end, the District Court construed the 
definition of mental illness against the insurer and held that bipolar 
disorder was covered under the better set of benefits.86 
The issue before the District Court in the 2007 opinion was whether 
the plaintiff actually had bipolar disorder.87  The insurer contended that 
the plaintiff did not have bipolar disorder for two alternative reasons; 
that is, that no brain scans showed any changes in the plaintiff’s brain 
and, in the alternative, that bipolar disorder cannot yet be diagnosed with 
a brain scan.88  The Court, perhaps confused by the insurer’s pro-brain 
scan and then con-brain scan argument, ruled in favor of the plaintiff.89 
Since the time of these cases, and as discussed in more detail below 
in Part III, both Congress and many state legislatures have passed laws 
that require some (but certainly not all) health insurance plans to provide 
some (but not necessarily complete) parity in their coverage of physical 
 
 81. Id. at *12-13 (internal citations omitted). 
 82. Id. at *13, n. 6. 
 83. Id. at *15. 
 84. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS, Fourth Edition xxx (4th ed., Text Rev., 2000) (stating that “[a]lthough this 
volume is titled the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the term mental 
disorder unfortunately implies a distinction between ‘mental’ disorders and ‘physical’ disorders that 
is a reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism.  A compelling literature documents that there 
is much ‘physical’ in ‘mental’ disorders and much ‘mental’ in ‘physical’ disorders.  The problem 
raised by the term ‘mental’ disorders has been much clearer than its solution, and, unfortunately, the 
term persists in the title of the DSM-IV because we have not found an appropriate substitute.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 85. Fitts, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *16. 
 86. Id. at *24-25. 
 87. Fitts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33397, at *2. 
 88. Id. at *25. 
 89. Id. at *25-26. (stating that “[a]lthough bipolar disorder is an organic brain disorder 
associated with physiological changes in the brain, there is no test that reveals or confirms the 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder, and [the plaintiff] cannot be required to produce what does not exist in 
order to prevail.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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and mental health conditions.  For those health insurance plans that are 
not regulated by a federal or state parity law (including public programs 
such as the Medicaid Program90) and for regulated insurance plans based 
in states with incomplete parity laws, the outcome of a plaintiff’s case 
against the insurer for the better set of benefits will depend on whether 
and how the plan defines mental illness and how the court interprets 
either the definition or the undefined phrase. 
One question is whether and how advances in neuroscience, 
including structural and functional neuroimaging, will impact the scope 
of insurance coverage disputes.  Based on litigants’ liberal use of 
psychiatric, psychological, and neuroimaging evidence to support brain-
based claims, starting in the late 1980s, as well as stakeholders’ use of 
neuroimaging evidence in mental health parity debates and disability 
claim proceedings, as discussed in Parts III-V, infra, I would anticipate 
plaintiffs’ continued use of the behavioral and brain sciences to argue 
that certain mental disorders are biological in nature and therefore 
deserving of benefits applicable to physical illnesses.  Given decisions in 
cases such as Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe,91 which 
found that bipolar disorder was an illness of the brain that stemmed from 
physical and biological causes,92 I also anticipate that plaintiffs’ 
neuroscience-based claims may have some success in jurisdictions that 
look to the cause or origin of the plaintiff’s disorder, especially if the 
disorder is one of the better known DSM-IV Axis I clinical disorders 
(such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder), or Axis III general medical 
conditions that plays a role in the development, continuance, or 
exacerbation of an Axis I and II disorder (such as a brain injury or AIDS 
that can result in symptoms of mental illness). 
In cases involving other mental disorders, I suspect that the 
outcome will depend on whether that jurisdiction focuses on origin, 
treatment, manifestation, or symptoms,93 as well as whether the “first 
 
 90. See, e.g., Brunalli, supra note 43, at 622 (discussing the non-application of many state 
parity laws to public health insurance programs); TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, MEDICAID 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESSES, http://www.psychlaws.org 
/GeneralResources/fact12.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (noting that “[w]hile the federal 
government seeks ‘parity’ for treatment of lesser forms of mental illness by private insurers, it 
continues to discriminate against those with severe mental illnesses by denying them coverage 
under Medicaid when they require hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital.”). 
 91. Ark. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe, 733 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Phillips, 978 F.2d at 310-11 (noting that different jurisdictions use competing 
definitions of mental illness); Fitts, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *19 (noting that the courts have 
relied on at least three different approaches for defining mental illness). 
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impression” symptoms are physical (e.g., starvation and dehydration) or 
behavioral (e.g., delusions and hallucinations) and, if behavioral, the 
ability of the plaintiff’s experts to convince the jury that such behavior is 
brain-based.  Given the ready (Internet) availability of neuroimaging 
studies finding that emotion may be correlated with blood oxygenation 
level dependent (BOLD) activity in the limbic system,94 attention may 
be correlated with BOLD activity in the right caudate nucleus and 
globus pallidus,95 motor activity may be correlated with BOLD activity 
in the primary motor cortex,96 perception may be correlated with 
changes in the sensory association cortex,97 working memory may be 
correlated with BOLD activity in the prefrontal cortex,98 and so on,99 I 
anticipate that aggressive plaintiffs may try to argue the brain-basis of 
the many signs and symptoms of mental illness, including those relating 
to emotion (e.g., depression, mania, anxiety, and flat affect), 
consciousness (e.g., decreased attention span, disorientation, and 
delirium), motor behavior (e.g., underactivity, overactivity, and 
compulsive movements), perception (e.g., auditory and visual 
hallucinations and other distortions of real events), long- and short-term 
memory impairments, speech, insight, and thinking (including thoughts 
of persecution or Apocryphal doom).100  I also anticipate that defendants, 
like the defendant in Fitts v. Unum Life Insurance Company, may 
respond by arguing either that mental disorders cannot yet be diagnosed 
by a brain scan or that the plaintiff failed to introduce a brain scan that 
would have provided objective evidence of a mental disorder.101 
 
 94. NEIL R. CARLSON, PHYSIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR 335 (6th ed. 1998). 
 95. J.M. De La Fuente et al., Brain Glucose Metabolism in Borderline Personality Disorder, 
31 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 531, 537 (1997). 
 96. CARLSON, supra note 94, at 234. 
 97. Id. at 437. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Brian Doherty, ‘You Can’t See Why on an  fMRI’: What Science Can and Can’t Tell Us 
about the Insanity Defense, REASON ONLINE, July 2007, http://www.reason.com/news/show 
/120266.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008) (noting the frequency with which expert witnesses testify in 
legal proceedings and “reclassify complicated moral and legal questions as seemingly clear-cut, 
[brain-based,] scientific matters.”). 
 100. See, e.g., Appendix A (summarizing recent structural and functional neuroimaging studies 
in the context of mental disorders); Dawn Capp & Joan G. Esnayra, It’s All in Your Head—Defining 
Psychiatric Disabilities as Physical Disabilities, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 97, 106-14 (2000) 
(examining the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and genetic correlates of the signs and symptoms 
of many mental disorders). 
 101. See Fitts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33397, at *25 (stating that “Unum contends that [the 
plaintiff] does not have bipolar disorder because there are no brain studies showing changes in her 
brain.  Yet Unum concedes that bipolar disorder ‘cannot be diagnosed with a brain scan.’”) (internal 
references omitted). 
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How should we assess these neuroscience-based claims?  Scholars 
already have laid the groundwork for evaluating claims made about 
fMRI-lie detectors in terms of meeting relevance and reliability 
requirements set forth in civil and criminal rules of evidence.102  In 
scope-of-insurance lawsuits involving functional neuroimaging 
evidence, litigants very well may have similar evidentiary defenses 
based on many of the same relevancy and reliability problems.  These 
include, but certainly are not limited to, underlying problems with the 
theory of neurovascular coupling, the time lag associated with blood 
flow, the localization of neuronal activity, the statistical averaging of 
images, paired image subtraction, subject selection, the number of 
subjects and implications for statistical significance, as well as broader 
philosophical concerns relating to the inherent sociocultural and 
historical subjectivity of diagnosing and classifying psychiatric 
conditions.103  A review of structural and functional neuroimaging 
studies involving individuals with mental disorders reveals several 
additional limitations, including the effect that different psychotropic 
drug regimens, alcohol and illegal drug use (given the large number of 
individuals who have mental disorders and co-occurring substance abuse 
disorders), cigarette smoking, endocrine changes, nutritional differences, 
and activity levels have for study results, as well as the extent to which 
the duration and severity of the subjects’ mental illnesses may have 
contributed to the magnitude of any structural changes or functional 
differences identified during the study.104  Finally, insurers also have a 
range of substantive and normative defenses; that is, that statutory cost 
containment,105 lack of medical necessity,106 and other reasons justify the 
 
 102. See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 10; Kittay, supra note 10; Egan, supra note 10; Downie & 
Murphy, supra note 10; Keckler, supra note 10; Alexander, supra note 10. 
 103. See, e.g., Grace E. Jackson, A Curious Consensus: “Brain Scans Prove Disease?,” L. 
PROJECT PSYCHIATRIC RTS., http://psychrights.org/Articles/GEJacksonMDBrainScanCurious 
Consensus.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008) (discussing limitations on the use of functional 
neuroimaging for psychiatric diagnosis). 
 104. See, e.g., Robert B. Zipursky, Imaging Mental Disorders in the 21st Century, 52 
CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 133, 133 (2007). 
 105. See, e.g., Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2) (allowing insurers to 
opt out of parity if parity raises overall plan costs by more than one percent); Mental Health Parity 
Act of 2007, S. 558, 110th Cong., § 712a(e)(1-2) (2007) (exempting from parity group health plans 
whose compliance would increase total costs by more than 2% during the first year or by more than 
1% each subsequent year). 
 106. See, e.g., William M. Glazer, Psychiatry and Medical Necessity, 22(7) PSYCHIATRIC 
ANNALS 362, 362-65 (1992) (discussing insurers’ application of the medical necessity requirement 
in the context of reimbursement for treatment of psychiatric conditions; identifying key factors that 
underlie the concept of medical necessity in psychiatric practice); Nancy W. Miller, What Is 
Medical Necessity?, PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIG. (Aug. 2002) (stating that “[there are] as many 
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insurers’ coverage refusal regardless of the merit of plaintiffs’ 
neuroscience-based claims. 
Finally, I anticipate that increased public understanding of the 
behavioral and brain sciences may impact the application of the 
layperson standard in jurisdictions that follow it.  Remember the Eighth 
Circuit case in which the court stated that the test of whether a condition 
is physical or mental depends on how a reasonable layperson would 
understand or perceive the condition?107  That case was decided in 1990, 
at the beginning of the Decade of the Brain,108 when the public may not 
have known too much about the causes of mental illness.  In the eighteen 
years since then, the public has been inundated with information 
regarding the treatable organic basis of many mental disorders.  For 
example, on March 16, 1993, The New York Times made public the 
findings of a confidential government report exploring health reform for 
individuals with mental disorders.109  The report, authored by the 
National Advisory Mental Health Council, stated that, “contrary to 
persistent myth, mental illnesses are both real and definable”110 and that 
“the efficacy of an extensive array of treatments for specific mental 
disorders has been systematically tested in controlled clinical trials [and] 
demonstrate[s] that mental disorders can now be diagnosed and treated 
as precisely and effectively as are other disorders in medicine.”111  
Steven Hyman, former Director of the NIMH, referenced several 
neuroimaging studies when he told Congress in 1996 that mental 
disorders are diseases of the brain: 
 
definitions of medical necessity as there are payors, laws and courts to interpret them.  Generally 
speaking, though, most definitions incorporate the principle of providing services which are 
‘reasonable and necessary’ or ‘appropriate’ in light of clinical standards of practice . . . . Medicare 
defines ‘medical necessity’ as services or items reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or 
treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member. While 
that sounds like a hard and fast rule, consider that CMS (formerly HCFA) has the power under the 
Social Security Act to determine if the method of treating a patient in the particular case is 
reasonable and necessary on a case-by-case basis.”); Sabin & Daniels, supra note 18, at 5 
(examining medical necessity in the context of mental health care). 
 107. Brewer, 921 F.2d at 154 (stating that “laypersons are inclined to focus on the symptoms of 
an illness; illnesses whose primary symptoms are depression, mood swings and unusual behavior 
are commonly characterized as mental illnesses regardless of their cause .”). 
 108. Library of Congress, Project on Decade of the Brain, http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain/ (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2008). 
 109. Pear, supra note 36, at A1 (citing National Advisory Mental Health Council, Health Care 
Reform for Americans with Severe Mental Illnesses, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1447 (1993)). 
 110. Pear, supra note 36, at A1. 
 111. National Advisory Mental Health Council, Health Care Reform for Americans with 
Severe Mental Illnesses: Report of the National Advisory Mental Health Council, 150 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1447, at Abstract (1993). 
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[T]he accumulating weight of the evidence [and] the great bulk of it 
resulting from NIMH-sponsored research demonstrates that mental 
disorders are brain diseases. . . .  We now know that individuals with 
schizophrenia have abnormalities in the size of their cerebral 
ventricles, those fluid-filled cavities in the brain; simply put, in 
schizophrenia, we see irregularities in the ratio of brain tissue to fluid 
in the brain.  NIMH-sponsored research also has provided compelling 
evidence that the connections of nerve cells in the brain, the circuits 
that underlie the processing of thoughts and emotions, do not develop 
or function normally in patients with schizophrenia . . . [Current] 
scientific techniques demonstrate beyond doubt that schizophrenia is a 
primary brain disorder.112 
In 1999, Surgeon General David Satcher released an influential 
report in which he referenced research in basic neuroscience, behavioral 
science, and behavioral genetics to support the characterization of 
mental health disorders as “real health conditions” for which “a range of 
treatments exist.”113  And, since 1999, the public has been overwhelmed 
with news regarding advances in neuroimaging, neurointerventions, and 
the behavioral and brain sciences:114   
 
An endless stream of news stories about the latest advances in brain 
scans and the chemical conquest of personality enhances the experts’ 
credibility and feeds into a belief that we have come to a sophisticated 
understanding of the intersection between mind, brain, and behavior.115 
As the public continues to receive this information, I suspect the 
application of the reasonable layperson test in health insurance coverage 
 
 112. Hearing before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Serv., Educ. & Related 
Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 363, 375 (1996) (statement of Steven 
Hyman, Dir., Nat’l Inst. Mental Health, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.). 
 113. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL, Executive Summary at vii (1999), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/ 
mentalhealth/pdfs/ExSummary-Final.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (stating that “[t]he U.S. 
Congress declared the 1990s the Decade of the Brain.  In this decade we have learned much through 
research—in basic neuroscience, behavioral science, and genetics—about the complex workings of 
the brain.  Research can help us gain a further understanding of the fundamental mechanisms 
underlying thought, emotion, and behavior—and an understanding of what goes wrong in the brain 
in mental illness. It can also lead to better treatments and improved services for our diverse 
population.”); id. at iv. 
 114. See, e.g., Jason Pontin, Mind Over Matter, with a Machine’s Help, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 
2007, at F3; Sandra Blakeslee, A Small Part of the Brain and Its Profound Effects, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
6, 2007, at F6; Sandra Blakeslee, Just What’s Going on Inside that Head of Yours? N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2000, at F6; Holcomb B. Noble, Pain at Work: Startling Images and New Hope, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1999, at F1. 
 115. Doherty, supra note 99. 
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disputes may begin to swing in favor of plaintiffs who claim that their 
mental disorders are physical in nature.116 
III.  THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY DEBATE 
In the early 1990s, many patients and patient advocacy 
organizations began to lobby Congress and state legislatures for health 
insurance parity, reasoning that there is no biological justification for the 
unequal insurance coverage of mental and physical conditions by health 
insurance plans.117  Insurers responded with a multi-layered cost-
containment defense.  By limiting mental health coverage, insurers 
claimed that they could reduce costs, maintain premium levels, and 
cover more individuals.118  Insurers also claimed that increased mental 
health benefits would give rise to adverse selection; that is, that 
consumers with mental health conditions that required expensive 
treatments would select those plans that provided coverage for such 
treatments.119  Insurers also expressed concern that consumer demand 
for mental health treatment would be highly responsive to the presence 
of insurance coverage120 and that consumers would seek treatment and 
reimbursement for “frivolous” emotional conditions and other mental 
disorders characterized by diagnostic ambiguity and uncertain treatment 
success.121  Indeed, the Commerce and Industry Association of New 
Jersey opposed legislative efforts to expand mental health benefits in the 
State of New Jersey for fear that the legislation “would uncover 
unworthy disorders such as shyness, boastfulness, fetishism, and 
impulsiveness.”122  The New Jersey Business and Industry Association 
 
 116. Shannon, supra note 29, at 75. 
 117. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 26, at 99 (stating that “[n]owhere is the gap between science 
and society more pronounced than in health benefit coverage for mental illness.”); LaFratta, supra 
note 26, at 405-06 (setting forth arguments in favor of parity); Kaplan, supra note 34, at 328 (noting 
that “[t]he parity movement came to popular attention in the early 1990s.”). 
 118. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 44, at 186 (stating that “[r]esistance to such legislation centers 
on concerns over cost, diagnostic and prognostic indeterminacy, and ambiguity at the line dividing 
medical from non-medical treatments important to the seriously mentally ill.”); Maggie D. Gold, 
Must Insurers Treat All Illnesses Equally? – Mental vs. Physical Illness: Congressional and 
Administrative Failure to End Limitations to and Exclusions from Coverage for Mental Illness in 
Employer-Provided Health Benefits under the Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 767, 773 (1998) (explaining insurer arguments against parity 
legislation). 
 119. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 118, at 774-77 (1998) (applying theories of moral hazard to 
mental health insurance coverage); LaFratta, supra note 26, at 405 (applying the same). 
 120. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Subsidizing Addiction: Do State Health 
Insurance Mandates Increase Alcohol Consumption?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 175, 176 (2006). 
 121. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 118, at 774-77; LaFratta, supra note 26, at 405. 
 122. See Kaplan, supra note 34, at 338, n. 97. 
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similarly worried that the legislation would require insurers to cover less 
serious mental disorders listed in the DSM-IV, including “sibling 
relational problems and caffeine addiction.”123  Stakeholders in favor of 
mental health parity responded, of course, by offering evidence that the 
diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders is precise, effective, and 
successful.124 
By the mid-1990s, proponents of mental health parity had achieved 
some success at the federal and state level.125  At the federal level, 
Congress passed the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (the 1996 
MHPA), which required group health plans offering a mental health 
benefit in conjunction with medical and surgical benefits to provide 
equality for any annual or lifetime aggregate spending caps imposed 
within the plan.126  A regulated group health plan that offered a lifetime 
cap of $1 million for treatment for physical illnesses, for example, would 
be required to establish a $1 million cap for treatment of mental 
disorders.  The 1996 MHPA did not, however, require covered health 
plans to actually offer a mental health benefit.127  Nor did it prohibit 
covered plans from imposing higher copayments or deductibles for 
mental health services, placing different limits on numbers of visits or 
days of coverage, or otherwise establishing different cost-sharing 
ratios.128  Thus, a regulated group health plan could reimburse a patient 
100% of the cost of a visit to an orthopedic surgeon, but only 50% of the 
cost of a visit to a psychiatrist.129  The 1996 MHPA also did not apply to 
small businesses that employed between two and fifty employees.130  Its 
parity provisions did not extend to substance abuse treatments.131  It also 
contained a provision allowing insurers to opt out of parity if parity 
raised overall plan costs by more than one percent132 and, finally, a 
sunset provision which phased out parity requirements for benefits 
 
 123. See id. at 338, n. 98. 
 124. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 118, at 777. 
 125. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 26, at 94-95.  See also Mental Health America, Mental 
Health Parity Timelines, http://www1.nmha.org/state/parity/parityTimeline.cfm (last visited Jan. 3, 
2008). 
 126. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 702(a), 110 Stat. 2944 (Sept. 26, 
1996), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1-2) (1996). 
 127. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (1996). 
 128. Id. § 1185a(b)(2). 
 129. See, e.g., The Senate Approves the “2007 Mental Health Parity Act”: Achieving Equal 
Treatment for the Mentally Ill, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly. 
pl?page=/colb/20071001.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2008). 
 130. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(1)(A) and (B). 
 131. Id. at § 1185a(e)(4). 
 132. Id. at § 1185a(c)(2). 
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furnished on or after September 30, 2001 and, after renewal of the sunset 
provision, after December 31, 2006.133 
Mental health parity continues to be an issue at the federal level.  
As of early February 2008, there are competing versions of a new mental 
health parity bill in the House and the Senate.134  Some mental health 
advocates believe that the new legislation, if passed, will represent a 
substantial improvement over the 1996 MHPA.  The Senate version, for 
example, extends the federal parity mandate to deductibles, coinsurance, 
and the number of visits each year.135  The Senate version still does not 
require regulated group health plans to offer a mental health benefit, 
however,136 and it also contains an exemption for group health plans 
whose compliance would increase total costs by more than two percent 
during the first year or by more than one percent each subsequent 
year.137 
Many state legislatures have enacted their own mental health parity 
laws, which vary widely in scope.138  Some of these laws require 
insurers to offer mental health benefits and to provide full parity 
between physical and mental health benefits; some laws require insurers 
to offer optional mental health coverage; some laws require insurers to 
offer mental health benefits equal to medical health benefits but only if 
mental health benefits are offered; some laws require a minimum level 
 
 133. Id. at § 1185a(f).  See generally Nelson, supra note 26, at 103-05 (discussing the 
limitations of the 1996 MHPA). 
 134. Paul Wellstone Addiction and Mental Equity Act of 2007, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong., (1st 
Sess. 2007); Mental Health Parity Act, S. 558, 110th Cong. §558 (1st Sess. 2007) (being “a bill to 
provide parity between health insurance coverage of mental health benefits . . . for medical and 
surgical services . . . .”). 
 135. See, e.g., The Senate Approves the “2007 Mental Health Parity Act”: Achieving Equal 
Treatment for the Mentally Ill, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/ 
colb/20071001.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (stating that “the new law would signal progress in 
the acceptance of mental illness as a ‘real’ medical condition, one that deserves the same 
accommodation and concern as heart disease or cancer.  Such acceptance could diminish the stigma 
attached to people who suffer from these conditions and could, accordingly, motivate people who 
might otherwise feel ashamed to seek care when they need it.”). 
 136. Mental Health Parity Act, S. 558, 110th Cong. § 712a(a), (2007) (requiring only parity for 
a group health plan that “provides both medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits”). 
 137. Id. at § 712a(e)(1)-(2). 
 138. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 44, at 190-91 (summarizing state mental health parity laws); 
Michele Garvin et al., Mental Health Parity: The Massachusetts Experience in Context, 47 B. B.J. 
18, 19 (May/June 2003) (summarizing the same); National Conference of State Legislatures, State 
Laws Mandating or Regulating Mental Health Benefits (Nov. 1, 2007), 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/mentalben.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2008) (summarizing the 
same). 
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of coverage for mental health benefits; and some laws contain yet other 
variations.139 
One question is whether advances in neuroscience will impact 
mental health parity interpretations or applications at the federal or state 
level.  I think they may in three different ways.  The first way relates to 
the way in which litigants or courts interpret the mental health benefits 
that are subject to a parity mandate.  Note that the original 1996 MHPA 
defined mental health benefits as “benefits with respect to mental health 
services, as defined under the terms of the plan or coverage (as the case 
may be), but [not including] benefits with respect to treatment of 
substance abuse or chemical dependency.”140  In the Senate version of 
the 2007 mental health parity bill, mental health benefits are similarly 
defined, although substance abuse benefits are now included as are any 
other benefits required under state law.141  If the Senate version passes, 
then regulated group health plans may have the flexibility to define 
narrowly the mental health conditions subject to the parity mandate 
unless State law contains a broader definition.142 
Many State laws do contain (not necessarily broader but) more 
specific descriptions of the mental health benefits that are subject to the 
State’s parity mandate.143  Connecticut, for example, mandates insurance 
coverage for most conditions listed in the DSM-IV.144  Mississippi 
mandates insurance coverage for any psychiatric disease identified in the 
current edition of The International Classification of Diseases.145  
Montana mandates parity for seven disorders: schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depression, panic 
 
 139. Garvin et al., supra note 138, at 19. 
 140. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(e)(4) (1996). 
 141. Mental Health Parity Act of 2007, S. 558, 110th Cong. summary of legislation, (1st Sess. 
2007) (defining mental health benefits as “benefits with respect to mental health services (including 
substance abuse treatment) as defined under the terms of the group health plan or coverage, and 
when applicable as may be defined under State law when applicable to health insurance coverage 
offered in connection with a group health plan.”).  The House version of the bill would use chapter 
89 of title 5 of the United States Code to determine those mental health benefits subject to parity. 
Paul Wellstone Addiction and Mental Equity Act of 2007, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).  
See generally Kevin Diaz, With Mental Health Bill Mired, Ramstad’s Legacy at Stake, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 29, 2008 (discussing the Senate and House versions and their 
likelihood of passing). 
 142. See Diaz, supra note 141. 
 143. See, e.g., Brunalli, supra note 43, at 601 (describing different states’ definitions of mental 
illness); Michael J. Carroll, The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996: Let It Sunset if Real Changes Are 
Not Made, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 553, 570-71 (2004) (describing the same). 
 144. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-514(a) (2008) (excluding caffeine use disorders and other less 
serious mental disorders). 
 145. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-9-37(f) (2008). 
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disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and autism.146  New Hampshire 
adds to that list anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, pervasive 
developmental disorder, and chronic post-traumatic stress disorder.147  
New Jersey mandates insurance coverage for  
a mental or nervous condition that is caused by a biological disorder of 
the brain and results in a clinically significant or psychological 
syndrome or pattern that substantially limits the functioning of the 
person with the illness, including, but not limited to, schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, 
paranoia and other psychotic disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
panic disorder and pervasive developmental disorder or autism.148   
Nebraska expressly ties its current definition of serious mental 
illness to the state of medical science: “any mental health condition that 
current medical science affirms is caused by a biological disorder of the 
brain and that substantially limits the life activities of the person with the 
serious mental illness.”149  Many scholars also urge the adoption of 
mental disorder definitions that are tied to the current state of medical 
science:  
Congress should pass legislation requiring full parity between certain 
biologically based mental illnesses and physical illnesses.  Such a bill 
should initially include a very small list of disorders with the clearest 
scientific backing for their biological bases . . . .  [I]t would be a 
relatively simple matter to amend the law in the future to add any other 
diagnoses that achieve wide scientific recognition as a biologically 
based brain disorder.150 
Given litigants’ liberal use of expert psychiatric, psychological, and 
neuroimaging evidence to support brain-based claims starting in the late 
1980s, I suspect that in States such as New Jersey that mandate 
insurance coverage for “a mental or nervous condition that is caused by 
a biological disorder of the brain,”151 plaintiffs may rely on structural 
and functional neuroimaging findings in an attempt to prove that their 
mental disorders are biological and therefore subject to the parity 
mandate.  Note that any neuroscience-based “evidence” would not 
necessarily be sufficient for the plaintiff; in some states, she still would 
 
 146. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-706(1) and (6)(a)-(g) (2007). 
 147. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417-E:1.III(a)-(i) (2008). 
 148. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-7.5 (2007). 
 149. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-792(5)(b) (2008). 
 150. Carroll, supra note 143, at 579, 582. 
 151. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-7.5 (2007). 
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be required to prove that her mental disorder substantially limits her 
functioning, which may require additional medical or social evidence 
regarding her inability to work or complete other activities of daily 
living.152 
In States such as Nebraska that expressly define protected mental 
health benefits in terms of whether “current medical science affirms [that 
the disorder] is caused by a biological disorder of the brain,”153 or in 
States that follow some pieces of scholarly advice and define protected 
mental health benefits in terms of those disorders “with the clearest 
scientific backing for their biological bases” and “that achieve wide 
scientific recognition as a biologically based brain disorder,”154 I suspect 
that aggressive plaintiffs also may rely on recent structural or functional 
neuroimaging studies in an attempt to establish a scientific backing for 
their claims in light of the dozens of well-publicized and readily 
available neuroimaging studies finding structural differences or 
functional associations between changes in regional blood oxygenation 
and conditions such as mild geriatric depression,155 post-traumatic 
stress,156 panic attacks,157 borderline personality disorder,158 eating 
disorders,159 substance use disorders (in states that do not expressly 
include substance use disorders within their illustrative list of protected 
mental health benefits),160 and so on.  Again, insurers would have an 
 
 152. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-7.5 (2007) (mandating insurance coverage for “a 
mental or nervous condition . . . that substantially limits the functioning of the person with the 
illness . . . .”). 
 153. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-792(5)(b) (2008). 
 154. Carroll, supra note 143, at 579, 582. 
 155. See, e.g., Yonggui Yuan et al., White Matter Integrity of the Whole Brain Is Disrupted in 
First-Episode Remitted Geriatric Depression, 18(17) NEUROREPORT 1845 (2007). 
 156. See, e.g., Noriyuki Kitayama et al., Morphologic Alterations in the Corpus Callosum in 
Abuse-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Preliminary Study, 195(12) J. NERVOUS & 
MENTAL DISORDERS 1027 (2007). 
 157. See, e.g., Shutaro Nakaaki et al., A Case of Frontotemporal Lobar Degeneration (FTLD) 
with Panic Attack as the First Symptom, 19(4) J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 
485, 486 (2007). 
 158. See, e.g., Jon E. Grant et al., Frontal White Matter Integrity in Borderline Personality 
Disorder with Self-Injurious Behavior, 19(4) J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 
383 (2007). 
 159. See, e.g., Mark Mühlau et al., Gray Matter Decrease of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex in 
Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1850 (2007); Angela Wagner et al., Altered Reward 
Processing in Women Recovered from Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1842 (2007); 
Section 4 of Appendix A to this Article (summarizing recent neuroimaging findings in the context 
of eating disorders). 
 160. See, e.g., Section 3 of Appendix A to this Article (summarizing recent neuroimaging 
findings in the context of substance use and abuse). 
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evidentiary defense161 as well as a range of substantive and normative 
defenses; that is, that cost containment,162 lack of medical necessity,163 or 
other reasons justify insurers’ refusal to cover the extra mental disorders 
regardless of the merit of plaintiffs’ neuroscience-based claims. 
Thus, one way in which advances in neuroimaging may impact 
mental health parity law relates to the interpretation of the mental health 
benefits that are subject to a parity mandate.  A second way such 
advances may impact mental health parity law is to provide support for 
the passage of parity legislation in states that do not have such 
legislation or support for more stringent parity legislation at the federal 
or state level.  When the Texas Legislature was considering a mental 
health parity bill in 1991, Senator Mike Moncrief (D-Fort Worth), the 
bill’s sponsor, wanted the Texas Legislature to understand why he was 
concerned about insurers’ willingness to cover treatments for 
neurological disorders such as Parkinson’s disease but not mental 
disorders such as schizophrenia.164  Senator Moncrief told the 
Legislature that the disparate treatment was illogical because both 
conditions involve an imbalance of the same chemical: “‘[The] chemical 
factor in the brain involved in both of these diseases is the same; it’s 
dopamine.  One disease involves an overabundance of dopamine while 
the other is a shortage of the identical neurotransmitter.’”165  I anticipate 
that proponents of mental health parity legislation will continue to use 
neuroscience to illustrate what they perceive to be illogical or unjust 
coverage discrepancies.166  For example, in a 2004 essay published in the 
Harvard Journal on Legislation, Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-
R.I.) argued that, “In the face of a growing body of scientific literature 
documenting the biochemical nature of mental illnesses, the status quo 
of insurance discrimination against those who suffer from such illnesses 
 
 161. See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 10; Kittay, supra note 10; Egan, supra note 10; Downie & 
Murphy, supra note 10; Keckler, supra note 10; Alexander, supra note 10. 
 162. See, e.g., the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2) (allowing 
insurers to opt out of parity if parity raises overall plan costs more than one percent); Mental Health 
Parity Act of 2007, S. 558, 110th Cong. § 712a(e)(1) and (2) (2007) (exempting from parity group 
health plans whose compliance would increase total costs by more than 2% during the first year or 
by more than 1% each subsequent year). 
 163. See, e.g., Sabin & Daniels, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing medical necessity in the context 
of mental health care). 
 164. Carroll, supra note 143, at 579 (citing Tex. Floor Debate, 71st Leg. Reg. Sess. (Apr. 25, 
1991) (Statement of Sen. Moncrief) (transcript available from Senate Journal Office). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Beth Mellen Harrison, Mental Health Parity, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 255, 265 (2002) 
(stating that “given these advances in research, there is no scientific justification for treating mental 
health services differently than general medical services.”). 
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is indefensible.”167  Kennedy cited three National Institute of Mental 
Health (NIMH) research summaries noting that NIMH investigators had 
discovered “specific, subtle abnormalities in the structure and function 
of the brains of patients with schizophrenia,” that “one of the most 
consistent findings to date has been the appearance of specific 
abnormalities, or lesions, in the white matter of the brain in patients with 
bipolar disorder,” and that “animal research suggests that ‘different 
anxiety disorders may be associated with activation in different parts of 
the amygdala.’”168  Kennedy concluded: “In an era when researchers are 
churning out ever more science exploring the biochemical and 
physiological causes and effects of mental illnesses, there is no excuse 
for such differential treatment.”169  Kennedy is now the lead sponsor of 
the House version of the 2007 mental health parity bill.170 
A third way in which mental health parity advocates may use 
neuroscience is to argue that federal and state disability law provisions 
applicable to employers and places of public accommodation should 
prohibit insurers from offering unequal benefits.  Given that courts have 
long held that unequal benefits do not violate disability law, including 
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),171 even though these 
laws were designed to prevent discrimination against qualified 
individuals with disabilities on the basis of such disabilities, I do not 
think these efforts will be successful.  However, I anticipate that scholars 
and other disability advocates will continue to emphasize the legitimacy 
of mental disorders and advances in neuroscience in an attempt to gather 
support for ADA-mandated mental health parity.172 
In summary, stakeholders are using advances in neuroscience to 
impact the scope of insurance benefits and the mental health parity 
 
 167. Representative Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End Insurance Discrimination Against 
Mental Health Care, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 367 (2004). 
 168. Id. at 367, n.39. 
 169. Id. at 374-75. 
 170. Paul Wellstone Addiction and Mental Equity Act of 2007, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2007.). 
 171. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 44, at 188-89 (discussing the non-application of the ADA to 
insurance disparities); Diane Serritella, Employer and Insurers Not Obligated by the ADA to 
Provide Equal Benefit Plans for Physical and Mental Disabilities, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 112, 112-14 
(2000) (discussing the 2000 Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. case, in which the Ninth 
Circuit held that a group disability insurance policy offered as a fringe benefit that provided better 
benefits for physical disabilities did not violate the ADA and analogous state law). 
 172. See, e.g., Signorello, supra note 29, at 350 (calling for the recognition of mental illness as 
“the legitimate, typically treatable, and widespread ailment that it is.”); Gardner, supra note 31, at 
708 (stating that “modern neuroscience is leading the charge in allowing us to understand mental 
illness, and it continues to provide evidence that the distinction between mental and physical illness 
is often false.”). 
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debate in a variety of ways.  The major theme underlying these efforts is 
that mental disorders are biological in nature and therefore any disparate 
treatment is illogical, unjust, or both.  Note that if stakeholders convince 
“the law” that physical and mental illnesses are one and the same, then 
many mental health insurance coverage disputes and the mental health 
parity debate will be moot.173 
IV.  THE SCOPE OF PROTECTED STATUS UNDER DISABILITY LAW 
Elsewhere I have examined relatively low-hanging neuro-disability 
law fruit, such as which physical and mental health conditions examined 
during structural and functional neuroimaging studies may constitute 
disabilities under the ADA, whether an fMRI examination would be 
considered a regulated medical examination under the ADA, and 
whether the ADA and other disability, health, and civil rights laws 
provide any confidentiality and privacy protections to individuals whose 
brains are scanned using fMRI.174  Here, I would like to examine the 
broader question of whether and how neuroscience might impact the 
scope of protected status under federal and state disability law. 
A range of discrimination protections and accommodations are 
available to qualified individuals who have physical and mental 
disabilities under a number of different federal and state laws.  The 
federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, for example, prohibits employers and 
organizations that receive federal financial assistance from 
discriminating on the basis of disability against qualified individuals 
with disabilities.175  The ADA, passed by Congress in 1990, prohibits 
certain employers, state and local government agencies, and places of 
public accommodation from discriminating on the basis of disability 
against qualified individuals with disabilities and requires the provision 
of reasonable accommodations unless it would cause an undue 
hardship.176  State laws such as the California Fair Housing and 
Employment Act also provide individuals with protection from 
harassment and discrimination in employment because of physical or 
 
 173. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 34, at 360 (stating “[i]ronically, when these misconceptions 
disappear, the federal and state governments may not have to mandate coverage for mental 
disorders.”). 
 174. Tovino, supra note 4, at Parts IV & V. 
 175. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2007). 
 176. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2007); EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, SMALL 
EMPLOYERS AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/accommodation. 
html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008). 
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mental disability.177  One theme underlying these federal and state laws 
is that it is “wrong” to discriminate against individuals who have 
physical and mental conditions over which they have no control, and that 
it is “right” to accommodate them to help them participate more fully in 
society.178 
One question is how advances in neuroscience may impact federal 
and state disability law.  Neuroscience already is impacting policy 
discussions about the scope of protected disability status.  For illustrative 
purposes only, let us consider Title I of the ADA, which prohibits certain 
employers from discriminating on the basis of disability against 
qualified individuals with disabilities179 and requires the provision of 
reasonable accommodations unless such accommodations pose an undue 
hardship.180  The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being 
regarded as having such an impairment.”181  The statute,182 several 
different portions of the implementing regulations promulgated by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),183 a lengthy set 
of interpretive guidelines,184 and hundreds of judicial opinions185 are 
 
 177. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (2007). 
 178. See, e.g., Ramona L. Paetzold, Mental Illness and Reasonable Accommodations at Work: 
Definition of a Mental Disability under the ADA, 56(10) PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1188, 1190 (2005) 
(noting that individuals with mental impairments who can completely control their symptoms 
through medication may not be protected because they have control over their otherwise limiting 
conditions). But see Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, The Supreme Court’s 1999 ADA 
Decisions, http://bazelon.org/issues/disabilityrights/resources/99scotus.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 
2008) (noting, on the other hand, that the ADA generally protects individuals with bipolar disorder 
whose symptoms periodically arise even while taking medication).  See also Timothy P. Ward, 
Needing a Fix: Congress Should Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to Remove a 
Record of Addiction as a Protected Disability, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 683, 719 (2005) (stating that 
“[i]mplicit in Congress’s legitimate goal of protecting the disabled from discrimination is the idea 
that discrimination against disabled persons is unfair because it is wrong to treat a person differently 
based on circumstances or conditions over which he has no control.”). 
 179. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (2005). 
 180. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (2005). 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2007) (Title I definition of disability). 
 182. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining disability); § 12111(8) (defining “[q]ualified 
individual with a disability”); § 12114(a) (interpreting the definition of “[q]ualified individual with 
a disability” in light of alcoholism and illegal drug use). 
 183. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. Part 1630.2(h)(2) (2007) (clarifying that a protected mental 
impairment includes “any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic 
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.”). 
 184. See, e.g., Appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 1630 -- Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Background (distinguishing protected mental impairments from un-
protected characteristics for purposes of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h): “It is important to distinguish 
between conditions that are impairments and physical, psychological, environmental, cultural and 
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dedicated to distinguishing the conditions that will and will not result in 
an individual’s protection under the statute. 
For example, the statute itself clarifies that an employee or 
applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs is not 
protected, although an individual is protected if she has successfully 
completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program (or has otherwise 
been successfully rehabilitated or is participating in a supervised 
rehabilitation program) and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of 
drugs.186  The interpretive guidelines also clarify that the illegal use of 
drugs refers to both the use of unlawful drugs, such as cocaine, and the 
unlawful use of prescription drugs.187  The interpretive guidelines 
specify that the definition of “rehabilitation program” includes both 
inpatient and outpatient programs, employee assistance programs, 
professionally recognized self-help programs such as Narcotics 
Anonymous, and other programs that provide professional (although not 
necessarily medical) assistance and counseling to individuals who 
illegally use drugs.188  At the end of the day, an individual who currently 
uses (and may be addicted) to cocaine is not a protected individual with 
a disability; however, an individual who previously used cocaine and has 
been rehabilitated may bring an ADA claim against a covered employer 
if the employer’s discriminatory action was taken because of the 
individual’s record of addiction and the individual is qualified to obtain 
or keep the job in question with or without reasonable 
accommodations.189 
Although few argue that current drug users should be protected 
under disability law, there is some debate about the appropriateness of 
protecting individuals with a past record of addiction.  Over the past 
decade, stakeholders have begun to use neuroscience to support 
opposing views regarding the protection that should be afforded to past 
drug addicts. 
 
economic characteristics that are not impairments . . . . The definition, likewise, does not include 
characteristic predisposition to illness or disease . . . . Similarly, the definition does not include 
common personality traits such as poor judgment or a quick temper where these are not symptoms 
of a mental or psychological disorder.  Environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages such as 
poverty, lack of education or a prison record are not impairments.”). 
 185. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102, Notes of Decisions, 44-149 (2005) (listing hundreds of 
cases that distinguish protected disabilities from unprotected conditions). 
 186. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a)-(b). 
 187. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a)-(c), Appendix to Part 1630. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 178, at 692. 
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Consider the disease model of drug abuse and addiction put forth 
by Richard Millstein, the former Deputy Director of the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), and his coauthor Alan Leshner, former 
Director of the NIDA, in a 1999 article published in a top-ranked health 
law journal.190  In the second section of the article, Millstein and Leshner 
reference an fMRI study to illustrate how cocaine use changes the brain 
by leaving a “signature” on it.191  Throughout the remainder of the 
article, the authors reference several other fMRI and positron emission 
tomography (PET) studies investigating short and long-term changes in 
individuals’ brains following use of Ecstasy, methamphetamine, cocaine, 
and heroin as support for their two-part argument; that is, drug addiction 
is a brain disease with contributions of biology, behavior, and 
environment; and compulsive and uncontrollable drug craving, seeking, 
and use is responsible for disruption, crime, and other negative drug 
correlates.192  The authors’ thesis is that a disconnect exists between the 
public’s perception of drug abuse and addiction (that addicts “d[o] it to 
themselves”) and the scientific bases of drug abuse and addiction, and 
that this disconnect has created barriers to treatment and re-entrance into 
society.193 
Not everyone buys Millstein’s and Leshner’s argument that health 
and disability law should incorporate the disease model of drug 
addiction.194  While opponents of Millstein and Leshner do recognize 
 
 190. Richard A. Millstein and Alan I. Leshner, The Science of Addiction: Research and Public 
Health Perspectives, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 151, 152, 165 (1999). 
 191. Id. at 156 (stating that “[w]e no longer need to use inexact metaphors of eggs in a frying 
pan.  A study at the Massachusetts General Hospital utilizing functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) brain scans provides a modern day depiction of your brain on drugs.  MRI permits 
you literally to look into the brain of a living . . . human being while that individual is experiencing 
cocaine and to see the ‘signature’ in the brain of the drug experience as compared to that of the 
same individual given an infusion of saline . . . . The nucleus accumbens, an area at the base of the 
brain that is very important in drug abuse, not only because it is in an area that is activated during 
any pleasurable experience, but also because every drug of abuse has an effect on it, showed 
increased activity.”). 
 192. Id. at 158-60. 
 193. Id. at 152, 165 (stating that “[p]ervasive misconception about the nature of drug abuse and 
addiction have created barriers to its adequate treatment coverage under most health care systems.  
If we are going to make any real progress in this country we need to overcome that disconnect 
between the scientific facts and the ideology, intuition, and so-called common sense-based 
approaches to dealing with this problem.  Now that we have the science base, we can in fact mount 
a much more rational approach, and science can replace ideology as the foundation for drug abuse 
and addiction prevention, treatment, and policy strategies.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 178, at 694, 701-02, 704 (stating that “[t]hough it is popular, 
the concept that addicts lose the ability to regulate drug consumption is false — they can and, when 
properly motivated, often do . . . . All of the evidence advanced in favor of the idea that addicts lose 
control describes factors that predict addiction or physical changes that result from drug use.  What 
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recent neuroimaging studies finding brain changes as a result of drug 
use,195 they argue that any changes in the brain that result from drug use 
did not cause the individual to use drugs in the first place or, even more 
controversially, do not cause the individual to continue using drugs.  
Opponents thus argue that disability law should not protect rehabilitated 
addicts: “Congress should amend the ADA to remove the Act’s 
protection of past addicts—they had and made their choices; employers 
deserve the same opportunity.”196 
I anticipate that scholars and other stakeholders will continue to 
debate the value of neuroscience to the question of which physical and 
mental impairments should constitute protected disabilities.  
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of Millstein- and Leshner-type 
arguments, it is unlikely that just any condition or symptom associated 
with a neuroanatomical change or correlated with local BOLD-signal 
activity will result in protected disability status.  First, the ADA requires 
claimed physical and mental impairments to substantially limit at least 
one major life activity,197 and the courts have found that many claimants 
with traditional mental disorders were not protected because of evidence 
showing that the claimant was still able to work, attend school, and 
engage in other major life activities.198  Plaintiffs thus may attempt to 
use neuroscience to provide evidence of a physical or mental 
impairment, but neuroscience cannot provide evidence of the existence 
or significance of any work or other social limitations.  Second, the 
ADA’s Interpretive Guidance expressly excludes from protection certain 
physical characteristics such as “left-handedness . . . that are within 
‘normal’ range and are not the result of a physiological disorder”; 
“physical, psychological, environmental, cultural and economic 
characteristics”; and “characteristic predisposition to illness or 
 
is missing is evidence that these factors or physical changes cause, rather than merely result from, 
the behavior that we call the disease of addiction.  Brain chemistry, genetics, and psychological and 
environmental factors do not cause the addict to consistently perform complex activities against his 
will . . . .  It is true that drugs change the internal chemistry of the brain.  It does not follow from 
that observation that the addict is therefore forced to take drugs.”). 
 195. Id. at 704 (stating that “[i]t is true that drugs change the internal chemistry of the brain.”). 
 196. Id. at 720. 
 197. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2007) (stating that “the term disability means, with respect to an 
individual, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual . . . .”). 
 198. See, e.g., Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 952-53 (3rd Cir. 1996) (stating 
that neither multiple personality disorder nor a sleep disorder constitutes a disability without proof 
that the disorder also substantially limits a major life activity). 
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disease,”199 and some plaintiffs’ claims may fall within these express 
exclusions. 
V.  THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND OTHER BENEFITS 
The hypothetical I gave in the previous section involved the 
application of the ADA’s anti-discrimination and reasonable 
accommodation provisions to individuals who have a record of drug use, 
but litigants already are using advances in neuroscience, especially 
neuroimaging, to impact disputes about the receipt of benefits under 
public and private disability, social security, and welfare programs. 
To prevent healthy plaintiffs from receiving benefits when they do 
not have a disability, disability plans and programs tend to define 
disability in terms of an abnormality that is “demonstrable by medically 
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”200  Medical 
evidence is the cornerstone of disability determinations.201  Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), for example, is only available to 
claimants who can furnish medical and other evidence of the existence 
of a disability, including “medical signs and findings, established by 
medially acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.”202  
Because the Social Security Administration (SSA) will not consider 
claimants’ subjective pain or other claims as conclusive evidence of 
disability203 but will consider more objective evidence204 such as 
 
 199. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (Appendix to § 1630--Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Background). 
 200. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (2007); see also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (defining disability 
for purposes of Social Security Disability Insurance as an “inability to engage in any substantial 
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 
of not less than 12 months . . . .”). 
 201. See, e.g., Social Security Administration, Disability Evaluation under Social Security, 
BLUE BOOK, at Part II, Evidentiary Requirements (June 2006; amended April 2007), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/evidentiary.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) 
(providing that “[u]nder both the Title II and Title XVI programs, medical evidence is the 
cornerstone for the determination of disability.”). 
 202. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2007). 
 203. Id. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2007) (providing that “[a]n individual’s statement as to pain or other 
symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this section.”). 
 204. Id.  (providing that “there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically 
acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical 
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could 
reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered 
with all evidence required to be furnished under this paragraph (including statements of the 
individual or his physician as to the intensity and persistence of such pain or other symptoms which 
may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and findings), would lead to a 
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“abnormal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) brain scan[s],”205 I 
anticipate that more plaintiffs will attempt to offer neuroimaging 
“evidence” of their disabilities, especially in light of cases denying 
disability benefits when neuroimaging or other objective evidence was 
not offered. 
In a 2003 case, for example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reviewed a district court’s decision to affirm the Social Security 
Commissioner’s denial of the plaintiff’s claim for SSDI benefits based 
on her cervical strain, L5 radiculopathy, dysthymic disorder, reading 
disorder, somatization disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, 
fibromyalgia, associated pain, and chronic fatigue syndrome.206  In 
reviewing the administrative law judge’s assessment of the plaintiff’s 
subjective complaints relating to her fibromyalgia, pain, and chronic 
fatigue, the Sixth Circuit quoted the SSA’s statutory standard for 
assessing pain and fatigue, which requires objective clinical or 
laboratory manifestations versus subjective first-person complaints.207  
Given that no available laboratory tests confirm diagnoses such as 
chronic fatigue syndrome, the SSA stated below that it would allow 
findings from an “abnormal magnetic resonance imaging MRI brain 
scan.”208  The Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s 
conclusion that the claimant did not provide sufficient evidence of her 
disability status because she did not submit sufficient objective evidence 
of her pain.209 
The issue of whether alcohol and drug dependence can constitute 
compensable disabilities under the Social Security Act has been hotly 
debated for decades.  “Early decisions under the Social Security Act 
demonstrated reluctance to award benefits to an alcoholic.”210  In 1975, 
however, the Ninth Circuit held in Griffis v. Weinberger that chronic 
 
conclusion that the individual is under a disability.”). 
 205. Bartyzel v. Commissioner, 74 Fed. Appx. 515, 527 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that “the 
following findings will be sufficient, although not required, to establish a medically determinable 
impairment under the Act . . . . An abnormal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) brain scan . . . .”). 
 206. Id. at 518-19. 
 207. Id. at 525 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2008) (stating that “there must be medical 
signs and findings, established by medically acceptable or clinical or laboratory diagnostic 
techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment that results from anatomical, 
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be expected to produce the 
pain.”)); id. at 527 (stating that “evidence of an impairment must include objective clinical or 
laboratory manifestations.”). 
 208. Id. at 527. 
 209. Id. at 528-29. 
 210. McShea v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 117, 118 (3rd Cir. 1983) (citing Mays v. Ribicoff, 206 F. 
Supp. 170, 171 (S.D. W.Va. 1962)). 
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alcoholism can, standing alone, constitute a disability: “The proposition 
that chronic acute alcoholism is itself a disease, ‘a medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment,’ is hardly debatable 
today.”211  In 1981, the Fifth Circuit clarified that alcoholism, alone or 
with other causes, can constitute a compensable disability as long as “it 
prevents a claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity.”212  
More recent case law involving drug dependence has emphasized the 
need for objective evidence of addiction: “A claimant must show a 
behavioral or physical change associated with the regular use of 
substances affecting the central nervous system.”213  In 1990, the Third 
Circuit clarified that the claimant must show that she is addicted to a 
substance, has lost the ability to control the abuse, and that “the 
addiction renders the claimant unable to perform any gainful activity.”214  
As discussed in more detail in Appendix A to this Article, scientists have 
conducted dozens of neuroimaging studies in populations that use and 
abuse alcohol and illegal drugs.  Some of these studies find 
neurochemical and functional changes in the brains of individuals with 
drug and alcohol dependence.215  Based on courts’ liberal use of the 
alcoholism-and-drug-dependence-are-diseases rationale to uphold 
disability determinations,216 I would anticipate that future plaintiffs may 
reference more specific neuroimaging findings in the context of alcohol 
and drug use and abuse, especially because neuroimaging evidence 
already has worked itself into private disability benefit claims involving 
other conditions. 
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a district 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the NFL Players 
Retirement Plan and the NFL Players Supplemental Disability Plan 
(Plans) in a lawsuit filed by former Minnesota Viking Brent Boyd for 
disability benefits.217  Boyd claimed that he suffered organic brain 
problems after he was knocked unconscious in a preseason football 
 
 211. Griffis v. Weinberger, 509 F.2d 837, 838 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 212. Ferguson v. Schweiker, 641 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 213. Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 245 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See, e.g., Nora D. Volkow et al., The Addicted Human Brain: Insights from Imaging 
Studies, 111(10) J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1444, 1444 (May 2003) (stating that “[i]maging 
studies have revealed neurochemical and functional changes in the brains of drug-addicted subjects 
that provide new insights into the mechanisms underlying addiction.”). 
 216. Griffis, 509 F.2d at 837 (stating that “[t]he proposition that chronic acute alcoholism is 
itself a disease, ‘a medically determinable physical or mental impairment,’ is hardly debatable 
today.”). 
 217. Boyd v. Bell, 410 F.3d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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game in August 1980, and that his “constant flu-like feeling, fatigue, 
headaches, queasiness, forgetfulness, intermittent blurred vision, 
difficulty reading, lack of concentration, learning difficulty, memory 
loss, dizziness and light-headedness” qualified him for total and 
permanent disability benefits under the Plans.218  As part of the lawsuit, 
Boyd was subjected to nearly two days of neuropsychological testing.219  
Some of the physicians agreed with Boyd that his single photon 
emission computed tomography (SPECT) scan showed “decreased brain 
activity ‘consistent with head trauma’”220 and that he was disabled due to 
his August 1980 brain injury.221  Other physicians agreed with the Plans 
that Boyd’s depression, untreated hypertension and physical 
deconditioning, and not the alleged August 1980 head injury, caused his 
symptoms.222  In the end, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plans.223 
Based on the Boyd case and a number of other disability cases in 
which structural and functional brain scans have been ordered, used, or 
requested,224 I anticipate with trepidation the extent to which plaintiffs 
will attempt to introduce both structural and functional neuroimaging 
evidence in support of traditional and novel225 disabilities, especially 
 
 218. Id. at 1175. 
 219. Id. at 1177. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 1179. 
 224. See, e.g., Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing 
an instance in which a physician recommended a brain scan to clarify the disability insurance 
claimant’s diagnosis of possible metabolic disturbance, early Alzheimer’s disease, episode of 
ischemia, or embolus to the brain). 
 225. The health, disability, and welfare case law is filled with claims by plaintiffs for benefits 
based on a range of novel conditions and behaviors, such as phobia of driving in unfamiliar 
locations, known propensity to engage in risky behavior, ability to become angered easily, 
sensitivity to fragrances, cat and dog allergies, other allergies and chemical sensitivities, fear of 
cancer, grief, conversion disorder, albinism, eosinophilia, generalized stress, and so on.  See, e.g., 
Kaufmann v. GMAC Mortgage, 229 Fed. Appx. 164, 165 (3rd Cir. 2007) (claiming disability of 
fragrance sensitivity); Sinkler v. Midwest Prop. Mgmt., 209 F.3d 678, 687 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding 
the phobia of driving anywhere unfamiliar did not substantially limit plaintiff’s ability to work and 
therefore is not a disability); Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Center, 117 F.3d 1051, 1051 (7th Cir. 
1997) (considering the plainiff’s claim of disability based on high cholesterol level); Bukta v. J.C. 
Penney Co., Inc., 359 F. Supp.2d 649, 655 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (considering the plaintiff’s claim that 
conversion disorder was disability); Baker v. Greyhound Bus Line, 240 F. Supp.2d 454, 455 (D. 
Md. 2003) (holding that albinism not disability); Gallagher v. Sunrise Assisted Living of Haverford, 
268 F. Supp.2d 436, 443 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff’s allergy to cats and dogs not a 
disability); Fenton v. Pritchard Corp. 926 F. Supp. 1437, 1443, 1446 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that 
the plaintiff’s propensity to “go postal” or “go ballistic” not a disability); Shah v. Upjohn Co., 922 
F. Supp. 15, 40-41 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff’s allergy to job and fear of cancer 
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since many public and private disability plans define a disability in terms 
of whether there exists a “physiological disorder or conditions” or 
personality trait that is a symptom of a mental or psychological 
disorder.226 
How might we assess these claims?  Many of the limitations 
mentioned in the previous sections will apply, but note that the SSA 
requires disability claimants to be unable to engage in any substantial 
gainful activity for a continuous period of not less than twelve 
months.227  Courts have found many claimants with traditional mental 
disorders not protected because they were able to engage in some type of 
gainful work activity.  The burden of establishing disability is on the 
claimant, and substantial evidence of disability is required.228  Plaintiffs 
thus may offer neuroimaging evidence, but neuroscience cannot provide 
evidence of the existence or significance of any work or other social 
limitation.229 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have shown that stakeholders already are relying 
on advances in the behavioral and brain sciences to characterize 
traditionally suspect mental health conditions as brain-based conditions 
worthy of insurance coverage, statutory parity, protected disability 
status, and disability benefits.  By and large, the plaintiffs in the cases I 
reviewed were not making completely unfounded or speculative claims 
about neuroscience.  Most of the plaintiffs (or their experts) were 
making general although supported references to scientific research 
 
do not constitute disabilities); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102, Notes of Decisions, 44-149 (2005) (providing 
annotated list of hundreds of cases in which plaintiffs claim traditional and novel disabilities). 
 226. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (Appendix to Part 1630--Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Background). 
 227. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2) (2007) (providing that “[a]n individual 
shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or 
impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, 
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful 
work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate 
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be 
hired if he applied for work.  For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any 
individual), ‘work which exists in the national economy’ means work which exists in significant 
numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.”). 
 228. Carter v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 229. Id. at 940-41 (stating that “[t]he record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s 
determination that Carter’s seizures were not disabling.  None of the physicians who treated or 
examined Carter indicated that her seizures so severely restricted her ability to engage in 
‘substantial gainful activity’ as to be disabling.”). 
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showing that the brains of individuals who have a range of mental 
disorders may be neuroanatomically, neurocognitively, and/or 
neurochemically “different” when compared to the brains of healthy 
controls.  Although a careful review of the underlying studies does 
reveal many discrepancies and contradictions, the plaintiffs in the cases I 
discussed were alluding to general trends that are based in the scientific 
literature.  One of the defendant’s arguments—the argument of the 
insurance company in Fitts v. Unum Life Insurance Company that the 
insured did not have bipolar disorder because no brain scans showed any 
changes in the plaintiff’s brain—did concern me.230  The argument (and 
its alternative argument—that brain scans cannot yet detect bipolar 
disorder) concerns me because it shows the extent to which litigants are 
willing to throw into the ring just any neuroscience-based claim in the 
hope that something will stick with the judge or the jury.  One of the 
reasons I am excited about the emerging neuroethics and neurolaw 
literature is that I hope judges will read the many careful philosophical, 
evidentiary, and other analyses and issue opinions that are more 
reasoned as a result. 
What gives me real cause for pause, though, is the appropriateness 
of many of the stakeholders’ subsequent normative or substantive 
arguments; that is, that all mental disorders should be treated as covered 
or protected conditions for purposes of health, disability, and benefit 
law.  I do think that neuroscience gives stakeholders one additional 
source of ammunition, perhaps some will refer to it as evidence, in 
support of the normative argument that mental disorders should be 
treated more like physical illnesses for purposes of health, disability, and 
benefit law.  I also think that advances in neuroscience do give us reason 
to revisit age-old health, disability, and benefit law questions, such as 
“[w]hich kinds of mental suffering create a legitimate claim for 
assistance from others through [public or private] health insurance?”231  
But neuroscience does not yet and probably never will answer a range of 
questions that are more important to the future of health law and policy.  
For example, neuroscience does not tell us how we should allocate finite 
health care dollars among all of the different physical and mental 
disorders, including the expanding category of biologically-based mental 
disorders.  Even with advances in neuroscience, we are still left to weigh 
the value of knowing that many mental disorders may have a biological 
component against the cost of providing equal insurance benefits, the 
 
 230. Fitts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33397, at *25. 
 231. Sabin & Daniels, supra note 18, at 5. 
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cost of expanding the scope of protected status under disability law, and 
the cost of distributing additional benefits under other legal schemes. 
Neuroscience also does not give us a better definition of “medical 
necessity,” which is the key to reimbursement under most public and 
private health insurance programs and plans.  Neuroscience does not, for 
example, tell us when a structural or functional difference becomes 
significant enough such that its treatment should be reimbursed by the 
Medicare and Medicaid Programs or a private health insurance plan.  
Neuroscience also does not tell us whether we should take a “hard-line” 
or “expansive” view of medical necessity.232  For example, should our 
health insurers only reimburse treatments for impairments that 
significantly interfere with an individual’s ability to live and function?  
Or, should our health insurers reimburse treatments that would enhance 
healthy individuals’ current level of functioning?  Should we adopt a 
“normal function model” of health care (in which the target of clinical 
action is a medically-defined deviation and the goal of health care is to 
decrease the impact of disease or disability), a “capability model” (in 
which the target of clinical action is an unchosen constraint of personal 
capability and the goal of health care is to enhance personal capability) 
or a “welfare model” (in which the target of clinical action is an 
unchosen constraint of potential for happiness and the goal of health care 
is to enhance potential for happiness)?233  Neuroscience, as we all know, 
raises many new questions about the differences between treatment and 
enhancement.234  Even with neuroscience, then, health policymakers will 
continue to struggle with how best to identify health care’s goals, define 
medically necessary care, and determine how much medically necessary 
care public and private programs should provide.235 
The extent to which health law ultimately consults neuroscience to 
achieve its goals remains to be seen.  In the meantime, I urge 
policymakers not to completely defer to neuroscience due to, among 
other things, differences between the disciplines’ orientations and 
professional vocabularies.  Note in this Article how frequently statutory, 
regulatory, and contractual authorities differentiate between physical and 
 
 232. Id.; see also Glazer, supra note 106, at 362. 
 233. See Sabin & Daniels, supra note 18, at 10-11 (offering three approaches to health care). 
 234. See, e.g., Robert Klitzman, Clinicians, Patients, and the Brain, in NEUROETHICS: 
DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 229, 236 (Judy Illes ed., 2006) (stating 
“[w]hat if clinicians can improve upon a person’s baseline level of cognitive functioning?  Should 
clinicians be limited in doing so in any way?”); Erik Parens, How Far Will the 
Treatment/Enhancement Distinction Get Us as We Grapple with New Ways to Shape Our Selves? in 
NEUROETHICS: MAPPING THE FIELD 152, 153-54 (Steven J. Marcus ed., 2002) (stating the same). 
 235. See Sabin & Daniels, supra note 18, at 12. 
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mental illnesses.  Even though health law contains dozens of such 
differential definitions (with the result that less legal protection and 
fewer benefits flow to individuals who have a condition that falls within 
the legal definition of a psychiatric illness or mental disorder), the 
behavioral and brain sciences are not that rigid.  In its Introduction to the 
DSM-IV, the American Psychiatric Association admits that the concept 
of mental disorder, like so many other concepts in medicine and science, 
lacks a consistent operational definition that works in all situations.236  
For example, medical conditions may be based on various levels of 
abstraction, such as “structural pathology (e.g., ulcerative colitis), 
symptom presentation (e.g., migraine), deviance from a physiological 
norm (e.g., hypertension), and etiology (e.g., pneumococcal 
pneumonia).”237  Mental disorders also may be defined in terms of a 
number of different concepts, such as “distress, dysfunction, dyscontrol, 
disadvantage, disability, inflexibility, irrationality, syndromal pattern, 
etiology, and statistical deviation.”238  Although each is a useful 
indicator for a mental disorder, none is equivalent to the concept of 
mental disorder.239  In the end, the American Psychiatric Association 
decided to use the term mental disorder in the DSM-IV only because it 
“is as useful as any other” and “has helped to guide decisions regarding 
which conditions on the boundary between normality and pathology 
should be included.”240 
Medicine and science recognize the blending of the physical and 
the mental, but health law is only starting down that road.  Because I 
anticipate that neuroscience will continue to play a role in the 
development and shaping of health law, I recommend that traditional 
health lawyers and scholars (and not just the few who self-identify as 
neuroethicists or neurolawyers) be mindful of the ways in which 
stakeholders will use neuroscience to bear on the formulation and 
interpretation of the law.241 
_____________________ 
 
 236. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 84, at xxx. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at xxx-xxxi. 
 240. Id. at xxxi. 
 241. See Wexler, supra note 19, at 10 (encouraging stakeholders to consider ways in which the 
clinical literature might bear on the formulation of legal arrangements). 
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APPENDIX A 
Many patients, patient advocacy organizations, litigants, lobbyists, 
legislators, and scholars believe that the stigma against mental disorders 
plays a role in their lack of funding for research, their lack of parity in 
public and private health insurance coverage, and their lack of available 
and reimbursable treatments.242  Four sets of mental disorders, including 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, alcohol and drug dependence, and 
anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa, are frequently used to illustrate 
these claims.  This Appendix briefly examines these conditions and 
summarizes their neuroscientific investigation. 
1.  Schizophrenia 
The NIMH defines schizophrenia as “a chronic, severe, and 
disabling brain disorder” that affects approximately 1.1% of American 
adults (or 2.4 million) in a given year.243  Symptoms of schizophrenia 
include “hallucinations, delusions, disordered thinking, movement 
 
 242. See, e.g., Pamela Signorello, The Failure of the ADA-Achieving Parity with Respect to 
Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage in the Private Employment Realm, 10 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 349, 368 (2001) (stating that “[s]ome diseases are more politically ‘in’ than others.  We 
all know the more political backing there is, the more attention, the more funds, and the more 
patient-protection legislation.  My guess is that if AIDS rates a 10, then breast cancer is a 7, prostate 
cancer is a 6 . . . . Yes, you guessed it.  I am unable to assign a number to the mental health 
category.  If I have to judge by the coverage in the popular press, this category is close to the bottom 
of the food chain.”); id. at 368, 371 (stating that “[c]ontrary to lingering public perception, mental 
illnesses are not indicative of personal weakness, lack of character, or poor upbringing . . . . One 
thing is certain. The stigma associated with mental illness has supported the disparity in health care 
coverage.”); Nicole Martinson, Inequality between Disabilities: The Different Treatment of Mental 
Versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 361, 361 
(1998) (stating that “[t]he stigma of mental illness has kept many in need from seeking help, and it 
has prevented policymakers from providing it.”); Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in 
Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 63, 85 (1997) (citing 142 Cong. Rec. S3590 (daily ed. Apr.18, 1996) (statement of Senator 
Wellstone)) (stating that “[t]he stigma of mental illness has kept many in need from seeking help, 
and it has prevented policymakers from providing it.  And for too long, persons in need of mental 
health services who reach private coverage discriminatory limits have been dumped onto 
Government-funded programs.”). 
 243. National Institute of Mental Health, What Is Schizophrenia?, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2008); 
National Institute of Mental Health, The Numbers Count: Mental Disorders in America, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numbers-count-mental-disorders-in-america.shtml 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2008); see also Philip McGuire et al., Functional Neuroimaging in 
Schizophrenia: Diagnosis and Drug Discovery, 29(2) TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 91, 91 
(2008). 
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disorders, flat affect, social withdrawal, and cognitive deficits.”244  
Individuals who have schizophrenia may hear voices that other 
individuals do not hear or may believe that others are plotting to harm 
them.245  These experiences can make individuals who have 
schizophrenia fearful and withdrawn and cause difficulties when these 
individuals try to have relationships with others.246  Although scientists 
have not yet uncovered the cause or causes of schizophrenia, current 
treatments, including antipsychotic drugs, can minimize the symptoms 
of schizophrenia and help affected individuals live independent and 
fulfilling lives.247 
Elsewhere, I examined the scientific248 and social249 history of a 
variety of body and brain imaging technologies and the reasons for their 
use by investigators with varying backgrounds and interests, including 
psychiatry.  I suggested that scientists began using neuroimaging to 
investigate psychiatric conditions when explanations for these conditions 
were in transition, “as if this might settle once and for all whether 
illnesses such as schizophrenia are really brain diseases.”250  To this end, 
dozens of studies have used structural and functional neuroimaging in an 
attempt to better understand schizophrenia251 and to develop new drugs 
that will better treat it.252 
These studies have resulted in many discrepancies and 
contradictions,253 although some trends have emerged.254  A number of 
structural neuroimaging studies find that individuals who have 
 
 244. National Institute of Mental Health, What Is Schizophrenia?, http://www.nimh.nih.gov 
/health/topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Tovino, The Visible Brain, supra note 14, at Chapters 1 and 2. 
 249. Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function: A Historical 
Approach, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193, 193-95 (2007). 
 250. Robert B. Zipursky, Imaging Mental Disorders in the 21st Century, 52 CANADIAN J. 
PSYCHIATRY 133, 133 (2007). 
 251. Karen Faith Berman, Functional Neuroimaging in Schizophrenia, in 
NEUROSPYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: THE FIFTH GENERATION OF PROGRESS 745, 748 (Kenneth L. 
Davis et al. eds., 2002) (summarizing dozens of studies involving frontal lobe findings with 
activation paradigms in schizophrenia since 1985). 
 252. McGuire et al., supra note 31, at 94-95. 
 253. See, e.g., Russell T. Loeber et al., Differences in Cerebellar Blood Volume in 
Schizophrenia and Bipolar disorder, 37 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 81, 81 (1999) (stating that “[b]rain 
morphometry has been studied extensively in schizophrenic patients, and among the cortical 
differences identified two consistent findings are decreased cerebellar vermal volume and increased 
volume of the fourth ventricle; although contradictory findings are reported as well.”). 
 254. Berman, supra note 251, at 747. 
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schizophrenia have whole-brain gray matter volume deficits255 and 
enlarged ventricles.256  Volume reductions have been found to be most 
notable in the frontotemporal regions, medial temporal lobe structures, 
and sometimes the prefrontal cortex and other parts of the temporal lobe, 
including the superior temporal gyrus.257  Some neuroimaging studies 
find that “brain abnormalities associated with schizophrenia progress as 
the disorder develops.”258  Some neuroimaging studies show that 
individuals with schizophrenia have abnormal prefrontal activity during 
tests involving working memory and, during other tasks, deficits in 
cingulated cortex as well as alterations in frontal-temporal and other 
intracortical functional relationship.259  Some neuroimaging 
abnormalities are evident before the onset of the disorder, which may 
suggest that neuroimaging could be used to detect pathophysiological 
changes associated with the disorder before the onset of frank illness.260  
Many neuroimaging studies have been devoted to studying the effects of 
antipsychotic drugs (especially Clozapine) on the brains of individuals 
with schizophrenia, with some findings relating to the primary site of 
therapeutic action and optimal dosages of antipsychotics.261  It is not 
unusual for a study or review article to conclude that chronic 
schizophrenia is associated with “extensive neuroanatomical, 
neurocognitive and neurochemical abnormalities,”262 but also to 
emphasize the challenges presented by the diagnosis and treatment of 
schizophrenia.263 
Many neuroimaging studies have been heavily criticized for failing 
to take into account the confounding effects of antipsychotic and other 
medication regimens, illicit drug use, cigarette smoking, endocrine 
changes, activity level, and diet.264  Notwithstanding, many scientists 
 
 255. See, e.g., Robert B. Zipursky et al., Widespread Cerebral Gray Matter Volume Deficits in 
Schizophrenia, 49(3) ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 195 (1992); Raquel E. Gur et al., 
Deconstructing Psychosis with Human Brain Imaging, 33(4) SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 921, 922 
(2007). 
 256. See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 250, at 133; Loeber et al., supra note 253, at 81. 
 257. See, e.g., Gur et al., supra note 255, at 922. 
 258. See, e.g., McGuire et al., supra note 243, at 96. 
 259. Berman, supra note 251, at 747. 
 260. McGuire et al., supra note 243, at 92 (stating that “[t]he ability of neuroimaging to detect 
pathophysiological changes in advance of clinical symptoms points to its potential as an aid to 
diagnosis.”). 
 261. Id. at 95. 
 262. Id. at 96 
 263. Id. 
 264. See, e.g., Birgit Abler et al., Abnormal Reward System Activation in Mania, 
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 2217, 2226 (2007); Zipursky, supra note 250, at 133. 
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now believe that schizophrenia is “associated with measurable, objective 
signs of altered brain function.”265  Although some scientists are 
pessimistic about treatment outcomes due to the reported structural and 
functional differences found between the brains of individuals with 
schizophrenia and healthy controls,266 others are confident that future 
neuroimaging studies will lead to information that has “the potential to 
lead to direct intervention.”267 
2.  Bipolar Disorder 
Approximately 2.6% of  American adults (or 5.7 million) suffer 
from bipolar disorder in a given year.268  The NIMH defines bipolar 
disorder, also known as manic-depressive disorder, as a serious mental 
disorder “that causes shifts in a person’s mood, energy, and ability to 
function.”269  Bipolar disorder can cause dramatic mood swings from 
overly “high” and/or irritable (mania) to sad and hopeless (depression), 
and then back again, often with periods of normal mood in between.270  
Although scientists have not yet uncovered the cause of bipolar disorder, 
they have developed drugs that, combined with psychosocial treatment, 
do help many individuals with bipolar disorder stabilize their mood 
swings and related symptoms over time.271 
Like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder has been the focus of many 
structural and functional neuroimaging studies.  Although whole brain 
volumes of patients with mood disorders, including bipolar disorder, 
may not differ from those of healthy controls, some structural 
neuroimaging studies show that regional deficits may exist in the frontal 
lobe, particularly in the anterior cingulate and the orbitofrontal cortex.272  
Some functional neuroimaging studies also have found the neural 
 
 265. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 251, at 745.  Fuller Torrey, one of America’s most famous 
psychiatrists, has stated that, the “evidence is now overwhelming that the brains of persons who 
have schizophrenia are, as a group, different from brains of persons who do not have the disease.”  
See Richard E. Gardner, Mind Over Matter? The Historical Search for Meaningful Parity Between 
Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 683 (2000). 
 266. See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 250, at 133. 
 267. Berman, supra note 251, at 754. 
 268. National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Disorders in America, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numbers-count-mental-disorders-in-america.shtml 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2008). 
 269. National Institute of Mental Health, What Is Bipolar Disorder? 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/bipolar-disorder/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Jakub Z. Zonarski et al., Volumetric Neuroimaging Investigations in Mood Disorders: 
Bipolar Disorder Versus Major Depressive Disorder, 10 BIPOLAR DISORDERS 1, 3-4 (2008). 
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correlates of altered reward processing or dysfunctional reward 
pathways (including elevated activation of dopaminergic brain areas 
when expecting high rewards compared to anticipation of no rewards 
and decreased ventral striatum activation when an expected reward was 
omitted) in individuals who have bipolar disorder.273  Some pediatric 
functional neuroimaging studies have found that bipolar disorder is 
“associated with abnormalities in a circuit thought to be involved in 
mood regulation that encompasses the amygdala, striatum and ventral 
PFC.”274  Like the schizophrenia studies, the bipolar studies have many 
limitations.  It is not uncommon for a bipolar study or review article to 
conclude, for example, that future studies must strive to more 
definitively establish the effect on findings of age, medication, and other 
variables.275 
3.  Alcohol and Drug Dependence 
An estimated fourteen to fifteen million Americans meet diagnostic 
criteria for alcohol use disorders and more than eighteen percent of 
Americans experience alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence at some time 
in their lives.276  An estimated sixteen million Americans use illicit 
drugs.277  A huge literature is devoted to documenting the results of 
structural and functional studies of the brains of individuals who use and 
abuse, depend on and withdraw from, and are abstinent from and crave 
alcohol and illicit drugs.278  For example, many structural neuroimaging 
 
 273. Abler et al., supra note 264, at 2222, 2224, 2226. 
 274. Jane Avery Serene et al., Neuroimaging Studies of Children with Serious Emotional 
Disturbances: A Selective Review, 52(3) CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 135, 135 (2007). 
 275. Zonarski et al., supra note 272, at 1. 
 276. Greater Dallas Council on Alcohol & Drug Abuse, Alcohol, 
http://www.gdcada.org/statistics/alcohol.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). 
 277. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONWIDE SURVEY SHOWS 
MOST ILLICIT DRUG USERS AND HEAVY ALCOHOL USERS ARE IN THE WORKPLACE AND MAY POSE 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS, http://www.samhsa.gov/newsroom/advisories/070713survey0610.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2008). 
 278. See, e.g., Yoshihide Akine et al., Altered Brain Activation by a False Recognition Task in 
Young Abstinent Patients with Alcohol Dependence, 31(9) ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & 
EXPERIMENTAL RES. 1589 (2007); Joanna S. Fowler et al., Imaging the Addicted Human Brain, SCI. 
& PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES 4 (2007); Andreas J. Bartsch et al., Manifestations of Early Brain 
Recovery Associated with Abstinence from Alcoholism, 130 BRAIN 36 (2007); Rita Z. Goldstein et 
al., Role of the Anterior Cingulate and Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex in Processing Drug Cues in 
Cocaine Addiction, 144(4) NEUROSCIENCE 1153 (2007); Sandra Chanraud et al., Brain 
Morphometry and Cognitive Performance in Detoxified Alcohol-Dependents with Preserved 
Psychosocial Functioning, 32 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 429 (2007); Dardo Tomasi et al., 
Thalamo-Cortical Dysfunction in Cocaine Abusers: Implications in Attention and Perception, 155 
PSYCHIATRY RES.: NEUROIMAGING 189 (2007); G. Dom et al., Substance Use Disorders and the 
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studies find “brain shrinkage” with chronic alcoholism.279  Some 
structural neuroimaging studies find an increase in hippocampal, 
cerebral, and cerebellar volume after abstinence from alcohol.280  Some 
studies find that changes in brain volume during short-term abstinence in 
chronic alcohol-dependent patients are confined to the white matter.281  
Some neurochemical studies have shown that  
large and fast increases in dopamine are associated with the reinforcing 
effects of drugs of abuse, but also that after chronic drug abuse and 
during withdrawal, brain dopamine function is markedly decreased and 
these decreases are associated with dysfunction of prefrontal 
regions.282 
Some functional neuroimaging studies find that “cocaine cues lead 
to abnormally high cingulate and low frontal lobe activation in cocaine 
addicts.”283  Many neuroimaging studies and review articles conclude 
that individuals who are addicted to alcohol and drugs have 
neurochemical and functional brain changes.284  Many neuroimaging 
 
Orbitofrontal Cortex, 187 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 209 (2005); Peter S. Kufahl et al., Neural 
Responses to Acute Cocaine Administration in the Human Brain Detected by fMRI, 28 
NEUROIMAGE 904 (2005); Nikos Makris et al., Decreased Absolute Amygdala Volume in Cocaine 
Addicts, 44 NEURON 729 (2004); D.J. Meyerhoff et al., Effects of Heavy Drinking, Binge Drinking, 
and Family History of Alcoholism on Regional Brain Metabolites, 28(4) ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & 
EXPERIMENTAL RES. 650 (2004); Clinton D. Kilts et al., The Neural Correlates of Cue-Induced 
Craving in Cocaine-Dependent Women, 161(2) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 233 (2004); Andreas Heinz et 
al., Correlation between Dopamine D2 Receptors in the Ventral Striatum and Central Processing of 
Alcohol Cues and Craving, 161(10) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1783 (2004); Nora D. Volkow et al., The 
Addicted Human Brain Viewed in the Light of Imaging Studies: Brain Circuits and Treatment 
Strategies, 47 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 3 (2004); Nora D. Volkow et al., The Addicted Human 
Brain: Insights from Imaging Studies, 111(10) J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1444 (2003); A.R. 
Lingford-Hughes et al., Addiction, 65 BRIT. MED. BULL. 209 (2003); Ingrid Agartz et al., MR 
Volumetry during Acute Alcohol Withdrawal and Abstinence: A Descriptive Study, 38(1) ALCOHOL 
& ALCOHOLISM 71 (2003); Rita Z. Goldstein et al., Drug Addiction and Its Underlying 
Neurobiological Basis: Neuroimaging Evidence for the Involvement of the Frontal Cortex, 159(10) 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1642 (2002); Stephen J. Uftring et al., An fMRI Study of the Effect of 
Amphetamine on Brain Activity, 25(6) NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 925 (2001); Bruce E. 
Wexler et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Cocaine Craving, 158(1) AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 86 (2001); R.S.N. Liu et al., Association between Brain Size and Abstinence from 
Alcohol, 355 (9219) LANCET 1969 (2000); Daniel W. Hommer, Functional Imaging of Craving, 
ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH (Fall 1999). 
 279. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 278, at 1969. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See, e.g., Agartz, supra note 278, at 76. 
 282. See, e.g., Volkow et al., supra note 278, at 1444. 
 283. See, e.g., Wexler et al., supra note 278, at 86. 
 284. See, e.g., Volkow et al., supra note 282, at 1444. 
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studies propose models that attempt to explain the loss of control and 
compulsive alcohol and drug intake that characterize addiction.285 
4.  Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) defines anorexia nervosa as 
“an eating disorder marked by an intense fear of gaining weight, a 
refusal to maintain a healthy weight, and a distorted body image.”286  
Bulimia nervosa is characterized by recurrent periods of binge eating, in 
which large amounts of food are consumed during a short period of time, 
followed by self-induced vomiting, abuse of diuretics or laxatives, or 
fasting.287  An estimated three tenths to one percent of young American 
women have anorexia nervosa, and an estimated one percent to three 
percent of young women have bulimia nervosa.288  Although “eating 
disorders are more common in women, they do occur in men.”289 
Anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa have been the focus of many 
structural and functional neuroimaging studies.  Some structural 
neuroimaging studies have found decreased gray and white matter 
volumes and increased cerebrospinal fluid volumes in individuals who 
have anorexia nervosa, as well as gray matter deficits in individuals who 
are weight-recovered from anorexia nervosa, which suggests that there 
may be an irreversible component to the structural brain changes 
associated with the illness.290  Some studies have found that the “region-
specific gray matter loss in the anterior cingulate cortex is directly 
related to the severity of anorexia nervosa, indicating an important role 
of this area in the pathophysiology of the disorder.”291  Other studies 
have not found a cerebral tissue decrease in weight-recovered 
individuals who suffered from anorexia nervosa.292  Some studies have 
 
 285. Id. 
 286. Nat’l Inst. of Health, Nat’l Cancer Inst., Anorexia Nervosa, 
http://www.cancer.gov/Templates/db_alpha.aspx?CdrID=426405 (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). 
 287. Nat’l Inst. of Health et al., Bulimia Nervosa, PSYCHOL. TODAY, available at 
http://psychologytoday.com/conditions/bulimia.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). 
 288. Eating Disorders Coalition, Statistics and Study Findings, http://www.eatingdisorders 
coalition.org/reports/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Mark Mühlau et al., Gray Matter Decrease of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex in Anorexia 
Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1850 (2007) (concluding that “[i]n anorexia nervosa, part of 
the global gray matter loss persists over the long run.”); E.K. Lambe et al., Cerebral Gray Matter 
Volume Deficits after Weight Recovery from Anorexia Nervosa, 54(6) ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 
537 (1997). 
 291. Mühlau et al., supra note 290, at 1850. 
 292. See, e.g., id. (stating, however, that “data regarding the reversibility of this cerebral tissue 
decrease are conflicting.”). 
10-TOVINO_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009  1:20 PM 
2009] NEUROSCIENCE AND HEALTH LAW 517 
found that “individuals who have recovered from anorexia nervosa may 
have difficulties in differentiating positive and negative feedback.”293  
Some, but not all, studies using PET have found brain serotonin and 
other alterations in patients who have recovered from anorexia 
nervosa294 and bulimia nervosa.295  Almost all neuroimaging studies 
involving individuals with anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa 
conclude that further research is warranted to determine the cause, 
specificity, and functional consequences of the structural and/or 
functional brain changes associated with these disorders.296 
 
 293. See, e.g., Angela Wagner et al., Altered Reward Processing in Women Recovered from 
Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1842, 1842 (Dec. 2007) (stating that “[t]he 
exaggerated activation of the caudate, a region involved in linking action to outcome, may 
constitute an attempt at ‘strategic’ (as opposed to hedonic) means of responding to reward stimuli.  
The authors hypothesize that individuals with anorexia nervosa have an imbalance in information 
processing, with impaired ability to identify the emotional significance of a stimulus but increased 
traffic in neurocircuits concerned with planning and consequences.”). 
 294. See, e.g., Ursula F. Bailer et al., Exaggerated 5-HT1A but Normal 5-HT2A Receptor 
Activity in Individuals Ill with Anorexia Nervosa, 61(9) BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1090, 1090 (May 
1, 2007); Ursula F. Bailer et al., Altered Brain Serotonin 5-HT1A Receptor Binding after Recovery 
from Anorexia Nervosa Measured by Positron Emission Tomography, 62(9) ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 1032, 1032 (2005); G.K. Frank et al., Reduced 5-HT2A Receptor Binding after 
Recovery from Anorexia Nervosa, 52(9) BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 896, 896, 901 (Nov. 1, 2002). 
 295. See, e.g., Walter H. Kaye et al., Altered Serotonin 2A Receptor Activity in Women Who 
Have Recovered from Bulimia Nervosa, 158(7) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1152, 1152 -153(2001). 
 296. See, e.g., Mühlau et al., supra note 290, at 1850-851. 

